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ABSTRACT 
‘ENTREPRENEURIAL PLANNING’ AND URBAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS-
ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF SPRINGFIELD, MASSACHUSETTS 
FEBRUARY 2003 
RICHARD JOSEPH NUNES, BArch., CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
MRP., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor John R. Mullin 
 
Set in the context of a growing trend toward increased privatization, changes in 
information technology and telecommunications infrastructure pose both challenges and 
opportunities for economic development. These developments have led to an emergent 
telecommunications-oriented strategic approach to urban planning. It is increasingly common that 
these policies couple urban media strategies with urban-wide economic development strategies 
together into one ‘high-tech’ economic development package. Under the rubric of ‘urban 
telecommunications-oriented planning’ strategies, the problem with these policies is when they 
are often viewed as new technological ‘quick fix’ solutions to complex urban problems. 
 
This thesis examines the potential for ‘high-tech’ economic development strategies as a 
catalyst for redevelopment, and their implications for the role of local government and non-profit 
organizations. In what is an overall trend toward privatization or the outsourcing of traditional 
municipal services, it will (1) illustrate how industry and government have undergone an 
‘entrepreneurial shift,’ and (2) identify how this trend, concomitant with changes in information 
technology and telecommunications infrastructure, poses both challenges and opportunities for 
economic development. Finally, it will (3) define what role local government must take as 
entrepreneurial planners. 
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CHAPTER I 
‘ENTREPRENEURIAL PLANNING’ AND THE THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INNER CITY “INFORMATION DISTRICT STRATEGIES”: THE CASE OF 
SPRINGFIELD, MA 
A. Introduction 
Industry and government have undergone an ‘entrepreneurial shift’ from ‘welfare’ issues 
to economic regeneration [strategies] as the key urban policy question (Hall and Hubbard, 1998). 
In other words, the traditional issues of ‘social equity’ are replaced by notions of competition 
whereby the rationale for the distribution of financial resources is based on the competitive 
strength of the players and local economic development groups that replace traditional 
government structures (O’Toole, 2000). The ‘entrepreneurial shift’ rests on the notion of public-
private partnership. This “new entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989) consists of four aspects: 
creating jobs, expanding the local tax base, fostering small firm growth and attracting new forms 
of investment (Hall and Hubbard, 1998). It is associated with an increasing ideological view of 
the world economic order generally and public-private partnership in particular, which has also 
been specifically referred to as ‘privatism.’
1 Privatism, though, should not be confused with 
‘privatization’ (Squires, 1991). The ideology of ‘privatism’ and the policies of ‘privatization,’ 
which have been adopted by national governments worldwide, constitute the transformation to 
entrepreneurial planning practices over the last two decades. Furthermore, this transformation has 
been associated with a more widely perceived trend known as ‘globalization,’ which has been 
characterized by a restructured manufacturing-based economy for a services-oriented one albeit 
facilitated by the Internet. Together, both ‘marketization’ and ‘globalization’ perceptions 
                                                       
1 Contrary to privatism, privatization is the regulatory policy that transfers the ownership of particular 
industries or public services from the government to the private entrepreneur. In other words, this could 
also be viewed as the ‘marketization’ of public services, which ensures quality through competition. 
1  
converge on the ability of a city to design and implement sustainable economic development 
programs. 
 
Concomitant with these perceptions, economically developed nations have also entered a 
period where electronic information transfer is widespread. Changes in information technology 
and telecommunications infrastructure pose both challenges and opportunities for economic 
development. That is, economic boundaries have become increasingly more flexible and 
penetrable, while political ones have maintained various degrees of rigidity. These challenges are 
imbedded in one essential policy issue: policies for city management generally and those for 
urban telecommunications-oriented development can no longer be considered separately.
2 
1. “Organizing Capacity” 
Telecommunications, as a catalyst for economic development, is part of a strategy to 
develop and retain existing businesses and attract new business growth. There is no unified theory 
of economic development planning that illustrates how this should be done. Fortunately, 
however, there are comprehensive strategic approaches that can yield ‘rational’ and pragmatic 
decision-making processes. These strategies or action plans are not always clear as to their 
approach. In fact, civic leaders often confuse development instruments with a development 
strategy. For example, industrial parks, small business assistance, one-stop business information 
centers, and tax relief are ingredients of an economic development strategy, not the plan itself. In 
Planning Local Economic Development: Theory and Practice, Edward Blakely (1994) states that 
a project must be distinguished from a strategy or program. The distinction, he argues, is that 
projects emerge from strategies or specific courses of action—not the other way around. Kenneth 
Voytek and Larry Ledebur (1997, 177) also point out that economic development is a “relatively 
                                                       
2 See Graham and Marvin (1999). 
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untargeted intermunicipal sales and marketing competition. Just as private firms must target their 
marketing efforts, communities must focus and rationalize  [Italics added] their economic 
development efforts.” The success of these efforts is contingent on an “organizing capacity”
3 or 
an ability to formulate strategies for the specific development goals of a community, city or 
region (Blakely 1994, 133). 
a. Urban Telecommunications-oriented Development and the Internet 
Cities are often attuned to Internet-disseminated practices in other cities; the frequency of 
which is modulated by an examination of emerging “best practices” by various economic 
development agents. The ensuing competitive pressure between cities complicates the 
formulation of strategies and policies. Politically, cities continue to pursue economic 
development strategies that many researchers and even practitioners have discouraged as cost-
ineffective, while the stakes increase with growing uncertainty among practitioners about what 
really  does work economically. Moreover, this decision-making process appears increasingly 
affected by a presumed need for visible and/or symbolic returns on investment (i.e., ‘flagship’ or 
promotional economic development). In his essay “Local Economic Development Policy: What 
Explains the Divergence between Policy Analysis and Political Behavior?” Harold Wolman 
(1988)
4 suggests that political rationality may not necessarily correspond to economic rationality. 
Whatever the challenges may be for economic development planning and decision-making, there 
is clearly a competitive element to the interaction of both rationales. A city’s image is inherently 
                                                       
3 In Leo van den Berg’s (1997, 1) article “Metropolitan Organizing Capacity: Organizing Major Projects 
in European Cities,” he acknowledges that “control,” as the power to adequately be able to “anticipate and 
respond to and cope with changing intra/inter-metropolitan relations,” is contingent on its ‘organizing 
capacity’—an “ability to enlist all actors involved, and with their help generate new ideas and develop and 
implement a policy designed to respond to fundamental developments and create conditions for sustainable 
development.” 
4  See also Reese and Fasenfest 1996, 281. 
3  
contingent on its ability to attract human, economic and intellectual capital through the marketing 
of a ‘quality of life’ character and the strategic management of its ‘competitive advantage.’ 
b. Promotional Economic Development 
Fueled by the Internet industry, ‘globalization’ has left conventional economic thinking 
dominated by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and market pricing at the cost of citywide 
approaches to unmet inner city demand.
5 On the one hand, a citywide approach emerges from the 
uneven economic development that presently contributes to the increased division of economic, 
human, and intellectual capital. On the other hand, it emerges from strategic economic growth 
through urban ‘sustainable development’ and ‘competitive advantage.’ As a result, some have 
argued for reshaping the global economy towards social justice and environmental sustainability 
at every level of practice, from global to the regional and local. Others, however, have argued for 
‘competitive advantage’ and strategic economic growth, from vertically integrated industrial 
‘clusters’ to ‘quality of life’ factors and city image.
 6 
 
                                                       
5 Consultant services like A Social Compact market the ‘quality of life’ [image] agenda through initiatives 
that probe into unrecognized economic development potential, particularly in inner city neighborhoods 
(State Farm, Bank of America, The Ford Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation sponsored A Social 
Compact, in consultation with Shorebank Advisory Services). The initiative looks to address the issue of 
business ‘sustainability’ beyond the ‘bricks and mortar,’ and generally demonstrates the hidden strength of 
under-serviced local market sectors by challenging poverty-based data sets (“A Social Compact: The 
Business of Emerging Neighborhood Markets,” 1998; “A Social Compact: Sustainable Businesses, 
Sustainable Communities,” 1998). 
6 Popular city image policies, whether from local or Federal government agendas, has been characterized 
by the ‘quality of life’ (QOL) agenda for a sustainable standard of living (Rogerson, 1999). In an effort to 
revitalize cities, economic development agents and political officials are willing to devise strategies for re-
inventing them (U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, 2001). Often rhetorical and contradictory, 
if not misleading, terms such as ‘sustainability’ and ‘quality of life’ market that effort. As strategies, these 
economic development programs also constitute for the actions behind ad hoc environmental impact 
statements (EISs) and sell the promise of a healthy future! See Harrison and Glasmeier, 1997; Bates, 1997; 
Henderson, 2000 for social justice and sustainability and Kotler, 1993; Porter, 1997; Held, 1996; Segedy, 
1997; Rogerson, 1999 for ‘quality of life’ factors. 
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Altogether, these developments point to the emergent ‘urban telecommunications-
oriented planning’ approach. The ‘information district’ or the ‘urban televillage’ is one of three 
major tools used in this approach (Graham and Marvin, 1999). Increasingly common, these 
policies couple urban media strategies with urban-wide economic development strategies together 
into one ‘high-tech’ economic development package. Under the rubric of ‘urban 
telecommunications-oriented planning,’ these policies are often viewed as new technological 
‘quick fix’ solutions to complex urban problems. Behind such ‘quick fix’ solutions, urban policy-
makers often jump onto the latest “policy band wagon” and adopt the same “trendy” approaches 
to municipal economic development programs without proper evidence of efficacy or recognition 
of infrastructure needed to sustain them. Philip Kotler (1993, 20), on the contrary, firmly notes 
that no two places [cities] are the same. He adds “no two places are likely to sort out their 
strategies, use their resources, define their products, or implement their plans in the same way.” 
When they do, however, Susan Fainstein (1996) notes that late coming new industry sector 
promoters will not see the profits of their innovators, so policy imitators are unlikely to flourish. 
The lesson being that successful local economic development strategies will generally depend on 
other city leaders not implementing the same strategies, which would otherwise cancel out the 
other’s “area campaign” (i.e., zero-sum game) (Adams, 1994). Furthermore, the underlining 
policy guideline is that the ‘real’ benefit of ‘urban telecommunications-oriented planning’ 
initiatives to the ‘real’ local need will require government to assess more critically the role of 
technology in these contemporary urban strategies, as well as their role in administering it. The 
design and implementation of urban marketing and promotional programs behind this effort 
should be concerned with their respective city histories, cultures, politics, leadership, and 
particularly in their ways of managing public-private partnerships (Kotler, 1993). 
5  
2. Entrepreneurial Planning: Competition or Collaboration 
Entrepreneurial planning has been particularly important in inner cities where its use has 
been encouraged by government organizations to achieve urban regeneration through private-
sector property development. The public sector plays a very important role in these site-specific 
redevelopment schemes, which include securing access to a redevelopment site, land renewal, 
public sector investment, development packages and the implementation of private-sector 
schemes (Adams, 1994). David Adams’ (1994) points that successful entrepreneurial planning 
must be able to select the right site, develop a strategy, exploit available subsidies, spotlight or 
publicize successful schemes, and assemble a team of people with all the relevant skills (i.e., 
“organizing capacity”). Generally speaking, this involves promoting and marketing an area, 
making land available and packaging development grants and subsidies. 
 
The power of an “information district,” as an urban redevelopment strategy, symbolically 
signifies a future ‘high-tech’ modernity for the city that promotes it. Behind these promotional 
developments are negotiative networks, which encompass government departments and quasi-
government organizations (i.e., private non-profits acting in the interest of government 
initiatives), the private sector and the public. According to Pauline M
cGuirk and Andrew 
MacLaran (2001), these networks or organizational forms continue to structure entrepreneurial 
urban governance. The entrepreneurial planner must work with speed, creativity and flexibility, 
as opposed to the rigid, process-oriented development control in traditional planning practices. 
Entrepreneurial planning is action-oriented and implementation centered. It will seek to identify 
and make available, from public funds, the additional financing necessary to turn unprofitable 
developments into profitable ones. In other words, it will attempt to “lever” or induce private 
sector investment into a weak market with public-sector finance (Adams, 1994). 
 
6  
The increased number of public-private partnerships in entrepreneurial governance, 
however, places an increased demand on the goal of political and economic interests. Generally 
speaking, the progressive image behind ‘flagship’ or landmark developments, like the 
‘information district,’ will help to reverse the negative perceptions of the city—a political 
rationale. An economic rationale might argue that, independent of a developer’s profits, the return 
on public investment should also be sensitive to ‘real’ local needs. The two rationales do not 
always correspond with each other, allowing some urban developments to carry on despite their 
limited success or cost-ineffectiveness. This conflict makes formulating urban 
telecommunications-oriented development strategies and policies particularly challenging for 
public-private partnerships.
  
B. Statement of Problem 
The heightened interaction among urban economies and polities raises a number of 
challenges for economic development planning and decision-making. Telecommunications as a 
catalyst for redevelopment and its implication for the role of local government should maximize 
on existing local market potential or introduce new market demand as an effort to augment 
existing market activity. Because cities operate in a highly competitive market, they can just as 
often drive developers to other jurisdictions as they can attract them. Therefore, economic 
development generally has less to do with how one adapts to market demand and more to do with 
how one builds markets. In this view, the use of ‘urban telecommunications-oriented planning’ 
strategies for land reclamation and redevelopment programs should allocate financial resources to 
sites that have the greatest potential for re-use rather than those that pose the most environmental 
concern. Nancy Leigh and Rhonda Hise (1997) have described this approach as a form of “land 
use triage”
7 in which planners take into account the nature of the local economy, the marketability 
                                                       
7See Leigh, Nancy Green and Rhonda Hise, 1997. Community Brownfield Guidebook, Atlanta: Georgia 
Tech, pp. 1-44. 
7  
of the land itself second, and finally, the probability that the desired new market activity can be 
sustained. The place-based approach, however, risks operating on a micro-scale at the cost of an 
integrated multi-sectored plan that would consider housing, transportation and workforce training 
among other issues. Therefore, limiting an urban telecommunications-oriented development 
strategy to a small district area leaves the strategic element of an integrated city plan absent. 
 
Furthermore, in a “theory of regions,” regional economists
8 insist that, before a number of 
economic benefits begin to accrue (i.e., jobs, public goods and revenue), urban planners must 
develop a ‘critical mass’
9 of socioeconomic factors. It is important to note that both the market-
economy’s ability to provide a public good (parks, clean air, roads, etc.) and the local 
government’s ability to have an effect on that same market-economy (in favor of the public) are 
definitive. Government and industry intervention of local and regional markets are limited with 
respect to economic development. In other words, neither industry nor government alone can 
achieve it. An awareness of a private sector’s ability to intervene for economic development, 
relative to the public sector’s ability to do the same is fundamental to the success of an urban 
telecommunications-oriented planning approach. Therefore, public-private partnership is crucial. 
When recognizing these limits, the public sector must assume an entrepreneurial role. This will 
require that “entrepreneurial governance” proactively promote the design, implementation and 
maintenance of local economic development initiatives, and lessen their focus on the rigid and 
inflexible process-oriented traditional planning practices behind development plan making and 
control. 
                                                       
8 See University of Massachusetts and University of Connecticut, (2001). “New England’s Knowledge 
Corridor: The Making of an Interstate Region.” 
9 A ‘critical mass’ is a level of socioeconomic factors required to achieve economic development. Some of 
these factors include secondary educational attainment, venture capital and public services—finance, 
insurance, and real estate. 
8  
 
C. Purpose of the Case Study 
The case study for this thesis is the Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program.’ 
The thesis attempts to ascertain the program’s potential effectiveness and legitimacy as an urban 
telecommunications-oriented development strategy, which packages vacant low-cost office space 
with business support services. Its underlining objective is to regenerate an area or areas of the 
city through commercial and industrial property reclamation and redevelopment. 
 
Preliminary expectations for the ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ hold that the 
current “Information”
10 industry sector in Downtown Springfield will not sustain it. This does not 
imply that the program should be abandoned. Telecommunications as an economic development 
strategy should maximize on existing local market potential or introduce new market demand as 
an effort to augment existing market activity. Often times, the challenge is not so much meeting 
market demand as it is creating it. Strategies of this nature should consider programs that span 
several financial years when operating in commercially less viable market areas. Sustaining such 
an endeavor will be contingent on a team of individuals or organizations of individuals that will 
provide an unyielding “driving force” behind the project’s conception. This includes the ability to 
successfully promote and market an area, and make land available with a mix of development 
grants and subsidies for its redevelopment. The key policy issue with the ‘Plugged-In City 
Technology Program’ will be maintaining its citywide approach by not limiting it to a small 
district area, which would leave the strategic element of an integrated city plan absent. 
                                                       
10 The “Information” sector (51*) includes publishing industries, motion picture & sound recording 
industries, broadcasting & telecommunications and information & data processing services. 
9  
1. Competitive Advantage 
Springfield is the largest city in Western Massachusetts and the third largest in the State. 
It offers low cost office and retail space, and housing competitive with major New England 
metropolitan areas centered on Worcester, Hartford, and New Haven. When economists speak of 
‘competitive advantage,’ they are often referring to a city’s ability to retain, expand and attract 
new businesses to their city (Porter, 1995). Springfield’s proximity to educational and 
employment training resources,
11 a competitive cost structure,
12 and high ‘quality of life’
13 offer it 
a unique ‘competitive advantage’ (EOEA, 1993). The advantage is partly due to the city’s 
location on the “crossroads” of two major routes of commerce between Boston and Hartford (i.e., 
Interstates 91 and 90). Accessibility by air includes three regional airports: Barnes Municipal 
Airport (Westfield), Westover Metropolitan Airport (also home to Westover Air Force Base, 
Chicopee) and Bradley Field International Airport (Hartford, CT).
14 
 
                                                       
11 The educational and employment training resources are particularly concentrated at the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst (UMass) and the Springfield Technology Community College (STCC). UMass is a 
huge economic resource for the Pioneer Valley. The university’s direct and indirect expenditures also make 
it one of the region’s largest consumers and service providers. It provides 5000 non-university jobs, many 
of which have been generated from university spin-off businesses (University of Massachusetts, Office of 
Econoimc Development (OED), “Impact, Increasing the Commonwealth: The Economic Impact of UMass 
Amherst”). STCC – Technology Park’s resources include its Network Service Providers (NSPs), the STCC 
Center for Buisness and Technology, the Springfield Enterprise Center and the Deliso Videoconferencing 
Center. The NSPs include Neon Communications, Inc., Williams Communications, Equal Access 
Networks, NEESCOM and Crocker Communications (http://www.stcc.mass.edu/TechPark). 
12These competitive cost structures include low industrial and commercial and office and retail (rental and 
land) costs, and relatively reasonable water costs due to the large supply of water—particularly in 
Springfield. 
13For the purposes of this study, ‘quality of life’ is understood as high speed telecommunications, skilled 
labor force or secondary educational attainment (college educated) and information generating institutions 
as opposed to more traditional economic advantages (e.g., proximity to markets and cost of labor), albeit 
factors of location. 
14 Twenty percent (20%) of Bradley Field International Airport’s traffic originates in Massachusetts. The 
area is relatively uncongested with room for controlled growth (EOEA, 1993). 
10  
Springfield also has a long history of technology transfer, which is rooted in its 
manufacturing origins as the site of the first U.S. Armory in 1794. The arsenal was revolutionary, 
developing a system of interchangeable firearms that led to mass production (e.g., Springfield 
Rifle and M1 Grand Rifle). The technological advances were patented, fabricated and exported 
by entrepreneurs like D.B. Wesson, a forerunner to Smith-Wesson in 1894. Today, a large 
population of engineers, machine operators and technical experts remains, who provide a skilled 
workforce that is representative of the regions’ roots in traditional manufacturing (e.g., fabricated 
metals, paper, and plastics industries) (City of Springfield, (2001b). 
2. Telecommunications Advantage 
Springfield also has a unique telecommunications advantage as far as security and 
redundancy is concerned. That is, the mere number of decentralized long-distance carrier services 
in Springfield is no happenstance. In a brush with historic fate, this decentralized city network 
was fashioned on the work of the (Defense) Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPANET), a 
military organization associated with the Pentagon that oversaw computer research in the 1970s 
(Fig. 1.1). In the early 1960’s, the agency researched defense strategies that could enhance U.S. 
military capability and strategically protect and improve communication systems simultaneously 
with the use of inter-networked computer system operations.
 15 
 
As a result, all North/South and East/West fiber optic networks converge in Downtown. 
These networks provide separate Points-of-Presence (POP) or access points to the Internet for 
                                                       
15The pioneering research of Paul Baran (1960s) envisioned a communications network that would survive 
a major enemy attack (i.e., “Cold War”). The “Distributed” network structure offered the best survivability, 
but the “Decentralized” model was instead applied to the City of Springfield. The research of the 
ARPANET has long since been repackaged and it is, today, widely perceived as the Internet. 
11  
each of the five major telecom service providers (TSP).
16 The TSPs in Downtown include AT&T, 
Bell Atlantic, Frontier Telecommunications Company, MCI/WorldCom, Brooks Fiber (Div. of 
MCI/WorldCom) and Sprint. These central offices contain state-of-the-art digital switches, which 
are interconnected with fiber optics cable networks (Fig. 1.2). The resulting telecommunications 
capability and bandwidth capacity make Downtown Springfield a major switch center for the 
Northeast. This also makes the city one of the few places in the country with uninterrupted 
telecommunications capability—a consideration for any high-tech industry (University of 
Massachusetts Amherst, Center for Economic Development (CED), Spring 1998). 
 
However, Springfield’s overall telecommunications infrastructure mainly consists of 
long-haul fiber (e.g., NorthEast Optic Network, Inc. (NEON)) (Fig. 1.3). This problem is 
associated with its lack of “loops,” which would facilitate the outward growth and development 
of telecommunications infrastructure on a citywide scale.
17 The absence of a citywide network 
has not encouraged the expansion of telecom-related uses, which other cities like Lowell, 
Somerville and Lynn have enjoyed. Therefore, the expansion of the existing telecommunications 
network, local economic development and urban telecommunications-oriented development in 
Springfield remains largely related to the “theory of regions” mentioned earlier. Urban planners 
must first develop a ‘critical mass’ of socioeconomic factors before a desired number of 
economic benefits are attained in Springfield. This should also consider the overall impression of 
the city by private entrepreneurs generally and the skilled labor force or secondary educational 
attainment and information generating institutions in particular, albeit sufficiently facilitated by 
                                                       
16 Other centers in the country, such as New York, Boston and Chicago, house their carriers under one roof 
(Pioneer Valley Planning Commission (PVPC), 1994; Springfield Business Improvement District (SBID), 
www.springfielddowntown.com/glance.htm). 
17 From the perspective of capitalizing on a service-oriented market economy, it is imperative that back-
office operations, such as banks, insurance companies, mail-order companies, and related hardware and 
software firms have access to high-speed Internet telecommunications (IT) infrastructure. 
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telecommunications access. Without this demand, TSPs are not willing to incur the cost of 
running fiber to areas where it does not exist. 
3. Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ 
The Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ packages vacant low-cost office 
space with business support services (e.g., tax credits, rent abatements, special utility rates, 
employee credits, and fiber). The program will market the vacant retail and office space of a 
designated area as Internet-ready or “information district.” These districts are envisioned, from a 
political economic perspective, as areas of desired urban regeneration that would potentially 
coincide with and respond to any real estate demands from the businesses trained at the 
Springfield Technical Community College (STCC).
18 The program, however, awaits the results of 
a two-phased study by Telecommunications Insight Group, Inc. (TIG),
19 who will author and 
implement regulatory changes, and develop and implement a comprehensive marketing strategy. 
TIG will also produce all licenses, agreements and contracts as required. The Springfield 
                                                       
18 STCC (1996) is one of only ten centers nationwide that is funded by the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), which meets the needs of telecommunications and information technology sectors; it is also sponsor 
of the STCC - Technology Park and the Springfield Enterprise Center. The college received a $5 million 
grant from NSF in 1997—in participation with 20 Northeast colleges/universities and 14 high schools. 
Together with $500,000 of their own and $4.5 million in matching grants from private telecommunications 
companies, STCC has created the Northeast Center for Telecommunications Technology (NCTT), which 
develops telecommunications education programs, textbooks and CD-ROMs, and monitors trends in the 
telecommunications industry. Both the Springfield Enterprise Center and STCC – Technology Park and 
NCTT provide thousands of square feet to entrepreneurial businesses region wide, many of which remain in 
the Springfield area after taking advantage of the park’s resources. NSF has also designated STCC as one 
of its nine National Centers of Excellence in Advanced Technological Education nationwide (Union New – 
Sunday Republican, September 3, 1997). 
19 TIG is a private telecommunications consulting team. It was contracted last year by the Springfield 
Media and Technology Group, Inc. (SMTG) and the Springfield Technology Initiative (STI) to develop a 
strategy that will maximize the economic development potential for telecommunications infrastructure in 
Springfield. STI is a group of public, private and non-profit entities that want to encourage regional 
collaboration. The group includes the City of Springfield, the Economic Development Council of Western 
Massachusetts (EDC), Springfield Business Development Corporation (SBDC), Telitcom, STCC, Western 
Massachusetts Electric Co. (WMEC), and private real estate officials. STI has also worked closely with 
TIG and SMTG to inventory and map Springfield’s telecommunications infrastructure and review city 
policies and ordinances related to telecommunications development in order to evaluate Springfield’s 
potential strengths and weaknesses. 
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‘Plugged-In City Technology Program,’ in this view, will coordinate with other regional efforts in 
Hartford, CT., in order to foster the interstate regional development of an “Information” industry 
sector. The combined success of these regional efforts will in turn facilitate local economic 
development goals in Springfield. 
D. Research Questions 
An inventory of vacant industrial and commercial buildings and lots, coupled with 
informal interviews and conferences, has contributed to the following questions regarding the 
Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ and its implication for the role of local 
government as entrepreneurial planners. 
1.  In what ways might the Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ help revitalize the 
local economic base? 
2.  Can a public-sector program better address local economic regeneration than a private-sector-
initiated one can? That is, can a publicly initiated urban telecommunications-oriented 
development program solely redirect the course of local economic development? 
3.  In other words, should local governments plan on the basis of what the private sector 
potentially would be induced to deliver, letting it largely determine patterns of land use? Or 
should one, for example, plan on the basis of addressing local needs, such as workforce 
development – analyzing the socioeconomic preconditions that determine private sector 
investment? 
4.  How do these relate? 
5.  Should an urban telecommunications-oriented development program be limited to a small 
district area, imbued with financial incentives irrespective of the industry sector? Or, 





According to Susan Fainstein (1996), urban economic restructuring can be assessed from 
two perspectives, a “global perspective” and a “local autonomy perspective.” The former assesses 
city development as part of a totality and the latter assesses it as a unique outcome of a particular 
history. The global perspective examines cities in the context of shifts in the regional and national 
economy. Whereas the local autonomy perspective identifies what internal forces have 
conditioned the city’s economic, social and political atmosphere. The methodology adopted for 
this thesis has assembled data that will help describe the urban economic restructuring context 
from which entrepreneurial planning has emerged. As a product of this restructuring as well as 
the increased multiplication of marketing strategies and entrepreneurial governance, it is more 
appropriate that the ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ be assessed from these two vantage 
points rather than restricting it to a case study comparison. 
 
The regional data that has been collected will determine the extent to which the 
Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ will be affected by shifts in the regional and 
State economy (i.e., telecommunications industry sector). A telephone survey of industrial parks 
in the Hartford-Springfield region has also been inventoried in order to assess the regional 
context. Particular emphasis, however, has been placed on local data. The data has been partially 
                                                       
20 Early stages of development for this thesis were guided by conferences attended, informal interviews, 
phone conversations and field observations and research. The conferences attended include “New 
England’s Knowledge Corridor: An Economic Study of the Hartford-Springfield Region,” University of 
Massachusetts and University of Connecticut, 2001; The Dot.Commonwealth Road Show to Western 
Massachusetts: “Pioneering the Next Generation of IT Companies,” Springfield Technical Community 
College, 2001; “Baltimore’s Digital Harbor,” APA 2001 National Planning Conference; “Digital 
Infrastructure and Economic Development,” APA 2001 National Planning Conference; and, “Community 
Strategies in the Information Age,” APA 2001 National Planning Conference. The early stages of the thesis 
development took place during a research assistantship with the Donahue Institute, contributing to the 
research and development of the “New Bedford Case Study” in Technology as an Economic Catalyst in 
Rural and Depressed Places in Massachusetts (Donahue Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 
2000). 
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assembled from two on-going inventories. The first has inventoried available office and retail 
space in Downtown Springfield.
 21 The second has begun a citywide inventory of vacant industrial 
and commercial land and buildings. 
F. Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is composed of four chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the research 
literature, which describes the transformation from traditional planning practices to that of an 
entrepreneurial planning approach. In section one, of the two-part literature review, the 
“entrepreneurial shift” describes this transformation as a change from the old to the ‘new’ 
economy and regionalism. Entrepreneurial planning is a highly debated subject, namely with 
respect to “social equity”—where the lending hand is not always the hand of the benefactor. 
Section two looks at this from a slightly different angle by discussing the factors of ‘competitive 
advantage’ and collaboration in entrepreneurial planning in Springfield and the surrounding 
region. Chapter 3 emphasizes how the success of the Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology 
Program’ is contingent on the extent to which it is able to connect with regional market demand. 
Chapter 4 identifies the unique local players, public-private partnerships and university 
cooperation behind the program. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and appropriately offers 
recommendations. It considers the implication of urban telecommunications-oriented 
development on the role of local government as entrepreneurial planners in the ‘new’ economy. 
                                                       
21 The office and retail space inventory has assessed available telecommunications infrastructure accessible 
from the street versus that which is readily accessible from within the building or vacant tenant space (built 
on existing data from the Springfield Business Improvement District (SBID) and phone interviews with 
individual leasing agents, building owners and managers). Finally the industrial and commercial vacant 
land and buildings survey has documented individual parcels with an account of their condition, size, land 
use restrictions, contacts, etc. The author in cooperation with the Springfield Office of Economic 
Development and the Springfield Planning Department developed both surveys. 
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Figure 
1.1: Centralized, Decentralized and Distributed Networks  
 
1.2: Telecommunications Providers, Downtown Springfield 
Source: Map Courtesy of the Pioneer Valley Planning Commission 
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Figure 









A. Entrepreneurial Shift 
In an increasingly more mobile and decentralized society decentralization is not the 
villain. In fact, it is because of decentralization that we emerge as communities (Shirky, 2001). 
The creative and destructive forces behind decentralization undoubtedly have been facilitated by 
technological innovation. Although, social construction theorists argue that it is impossible to 
identify an all-inclusive ‘impact’ of telecommunications on cities, because telecommunications 
and urban-economic transformation vary significantly across time and space (Graham and 
Marvin, 1996). The forces of increasing physical mobility and relative wealth, concomitant with a 
greater demand for privacy and the hope of greater security, contributes to this end by incessantly 
driving development outward (i.e., “urban sprawl”) (Zukin, 1995). 
1. Urban Economic Restructuring 
Urban sprawl, to the extent that it involves the disparity between the rate of land 
consumption and population growth, is one of the many facets of today’s tenuous and elusive 
urban-political condition, which is often described in conjunction with a ‘new’ urban-economic 
transformation (i.e., ‘globalization’). Two points should be noted regarding urban economic 
restructuring. First, technological advances are the most potent forces affecting the way we live, 
work, travel and communicate. Second, the new pressures of global competition now challenge 
old realities of business administration (Kotler, 1993). On the one hand, as an “urbanization” 
process, ‘new regionalism’ represents regrouped and newly formed trading blocs. These “super-
regions” or inter-regional trading blocs have reactivated metropolitan regions and reoriented them 
as nodes in the global transportation and communications network. On the other hand, as a 
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“localization” process, it represents the networking of many smaller economic agglomerations or 
‘clusters.’ 
 
These new pressures of global competition now challenge the old realities of ‘production 
organization,’ especially with regard to urban economic restructuring. According to Bennett 
Harrison et al (1996), regional economists and planners have long debated the characterization of 
business ‘clusters.’ On the one hand, they write of same-sector businesses (i.e., 
industrial/business parks). On the other hand, they write of diverse social and economic 
institutions. Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1934) identified these long-term 
transformative forces of ‘production organization’ as “gales of creative destruction.” Richard 
Florida (1996, 314-5) reinforces Schumpeter, adding that these forces also involve a geographic 
or regional element. He illustrates that the genesis of new innovative forms of ‘production 
organization’ is possible for older regions, despite their local economic bases being locked into 
outmoded technologies and traditional practices. Florida (1996) goes on to note that work teams, 
the integration of suppliers into product development and other organizational factors among 
these new forms allow for the transformation of mass production into ‘flexible’ production (i.e., 
old to new economy). 
a. New Economy: “Old wine in a new bottle” 
The ‘new economy’ is a political, urban-economic condition. It embraces a knowledge-
based and idea-based economy where, according to economists, the keys to job creation and a 
higher standard of living are innovation and new technology-imbued forms of ‘production 
organization.’ Unfortunately, however, many speak of urban change (of ‘decentralization’ or 
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“disurbanization” 
22and even ‘urban sprawl’), yet few have been able to define the ‘new 
economy’ as a set of qualitative and quantitative changes in the context of that transformation 
(Progressive Policy Institute’s (PPI), “The New Economy Index,” Sec 1, 1998). 
 
The ‘new economy,’ according to the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), emerged fifteen 
years ago in the United States. In the context of economic history and policy (political history), 
the previous economic order approximately lasted from the WWII mobilization to the oil crisis 
and subsequent recession, 1938-1974. It was built on a manufacturing-based economy of 
standardized production run by stable and hierarchical forms of ‘production organization.’ 
Between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s
23 these foundations incessantly broke down. As 
industries restructured themselves, states reacted to the effects of regional economic recession 
and sectoral [industry] crisis—lumber and wood products in the Pacific Northwest, auto and steel 
in the Midwest, farming in the Plains, textiles in the South, oil and gas in States like Texas and 
Oklahoma, and finally minicomputers and Defense in New England and California (Fig. 2.1, 
2.2).
24 
b. New Regionalism and the New Economy 
‘New regionalism’ can be likened to drawing a distinction between old and new 
economies. Since the 1930s, natural boundaries and features, land ownership and settlement, 
                                                       
22 In the early 1980s, Leo van den Berg and L. Klassen put forth a model of urban growth, which included 
four “phases:” urbanization, suburbanization, disurbanization and reurbanization, reinforcing the “creative 
destruction” paradigm. 
23 This period accounts for the oil crisis in 1973 to the real estate savings and loan crash from 1987-1991. 
24 These figures highlight the changes from old to new economies (1986-present), keeping in mind that the 
‘new’ economy is “an infrastructure of collaboration.” Kantor (1995) writes in her book World Class that 
“politics involves battles over distribution: who gets which slices of the pie. A community’s social 
infrastructure, in contrast, offers the prospect for expanding the pie. Yet, the social infrastructure (for 
collaboration) is too often neglected, allowing the area to remain fragmented and balkanized.” 
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religion, language, infrastructure and politics have defined regions and regionalism.
25 Although, 
the key forces driving today’s ‘new regionalism’ [in the United States] is characterized by global 
competition, information technologies, telecommunications and a “people’s desire to live in non-
urban areas” (Prestwood and Schumann). Neal Pierce (Union-News July 23, 2001) reinforces this 
‘new regionalism’ in a two-part scenario. First, it is the “world’s emphasis on economics instead 
of military power.” Second, it is “an end to the ‘tin cup’ era of besieged inner cities begging for 
federal aid.” This is underlined by the growing importance of metropolitan regions as national 
economic engines or “cash cows”
26 that “cross-subsidize,” according to Pierce, less wealthy rural 
areas with existing State and Federal funding. David Adams (1994, 136) refers to this as 
“leverage planning” because private sector investment is levered into a weak market by applying 
public-sector finance. In other words, urban planning is programmed and executed together to 
induce a private market response, or “a public action that will produce a sustained and widespread 
private market reaction” (Garvin 1996, 398). This stresses upon the role of entrepreneurship in 
public projects, where entrepreneurs “conceive projects when others are unaware that there are 
any opportunities available. Without the extra drive that entrepreneurs supply, these other players 
would be overwhelmed by the uncertainties of the marketplace” (Garvin 1996,405). 
B. Entrepreneurialism 
Local economic development discourse is “so pervasive” that it interests both left and 
right sides of partisan politics (O’Toole, 2000). It appeals to ‘entrepreneurialism,’ on the left, by 
asserting local cooperation, promoting identity of place and strengthening municipal pride, while, 
on the right, it supports ideas of ‘neo-liberalism’—promoting enterprise and a belief in the virtues 
                                                       
25 See Donna Prestwood and Paul Schumann, Jr., “Regionalism: Taking Control of the Future” 
(“RegionalReport” at www.glocalvantage.com). 
26 According to the economic forecasting firm of DRI-WEFA, metropolitan regions will continue to expand 
their economic output to almost 87 percent of the U.S. total by 2025. 
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of the private sector and emphasizing entrepreneurship where all forms of capital are exploited 
for economic development. This neo-liberal emphasis on private sector leadership, according to 
Samuel Nunn (2001, 161), would imply that any planning process aimed at urban development is 
likely to have more in common with a “private-managerialist planning” model, than an 
inclusionary public-planning model would.
27 In other words, the key question is: Should one plan 
on the basis of what the private sector is induced to deliver, letting it largely determine patterns of 
land use? Or should one analyze social conditions and plan on the basis of tackling local needs, 
such as workforce development? (Adams 1994, 137) 
1. Entrepreneurial Planning 
British new town development corporations pioneered entrepreneurial planning in the 
1970s. Their promotional campaigns were originally designed to attract industrial development, 
which was later adopted by regional development agencies (RDAs). In the 1980s, entrepreneurial 
planning assumed product-marketing strategies where consultants reported on and advertised the 
city by proposing a new urban image through a “comprehensive audit” of its strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. In the 1990s, these product-marketing schemes were 
incorporated with multi-faceted economic development strategies that invested in education, 
workforce training, enterprise development, telecommunications and, research and technology. 
This strategic economic development approach to entrepreneurial planning, today, involves pro-
active land promotion through public-private partnership. The success of land promotion and 
likewise for entrepreneurial planning is contingent on the local government’s “organizing 
capacity” for promoting and marketing an area, making land available, and packaging 
development grants and subsidies (Adams, 1994).
 In other words, there is a fine line between 
                                                       
27 See also ‘Initiative for a Competitive Inner City (1CIC). ICIC is a national non-profit, funded by the 
Harvard Business School. Together with the State of Connecticut’s Department of Economic and 
Community Development (DECD), ICIC has co-authored the Hartford Inner City Business Strategy 
Initiative: Creating Jobs, Income, and Wealth for Inner City Residents 
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inter-municipal competitiveness and collaboration
28 and the consensus
29 necessary for negotiating 
public-private partnership. For those policy-makers desiring to promote small and medium scale 
“industrial dynamism” through urban telecommunication-oriented development, the question 
remains whether this can be achieved by simply harnessing the entrepreneurial energy and 
initiative of small private firms.
 30 
2. ‘Competitive Advantage’ and the Ensuing Debate 
Michael Porter is a household name to most economic development and government 
organizations. His thesis of inner city ‘competitive advantage’ is applauded for its “thumbnail 
sketch” of inner city urban decay, its causes and the new approaches to urban revitalization for 
local governments, CBOs/CDCs or “third force organizations,” and the private sector. More 
importantly, he has stimulated productive debate on the inner city. Rather than focusing on 
individual companies,
31 Porter’s “strongest contribution to inner city economic development lies 
                                                       
28Telecom City is currently 200 acres of “telecommunications overlay zoning.” The district has been 
envisioned as a high-tech research and development park, encompassing three suburbs—Everett, Malden 
and Medford. The “district” remains fairly undeveloped; the sites of 17 buildings (Malden) that once stood 
in the area are “in various stages of demolition, but the search for new tenants (development) has been 
difficult. The telecommunications overlay zoning, which was introduced after the project’s conception has 
resulted in pending charges at Malden District Court. Boxford-based land developer (Robert Grant), Essex 
Capital Partners claims that government [State-chartered Mystic Valley Development Commission 
(MVDC)] has “meddled” with their business (e.g., pulling out of deals—only to turn around again in an 
attempt to buy the land instead). MVDC has even gone as far as pursuing a 10% interest on future 
development, based on the value-added advantage that TeleCom City is supposed to provide; MVDC has 
State-granted power to take property and oversee redevelopment. 
29 Where and when consensus is possible, conflict is often exacerbated. That is, each group demands, 
further still, that the other conform to its values and accept its priorities (Gans 2001, 65). Political 
economists argue that just because spatial barriers can be overcome (in certain circumstances), it doesn’t 
mean that they are being overcome (Kotval, 1999). As mentioned earlier, economic rationality does not 
always correspond with political rationality and these programs often carry on despite their limited success 
or cost-ineffectiveness. 
30 Numerous authors liken the industrial synergies or “untraded interdependencies” of innovative regions 
(e.g., Silicon Valley et al) to a culture of horizontally integrated or business to business relations for the 
exchange of ‘know-how’ (Bartik, 1990; Storper, 1997; Scott, 1995; Castells, 1994). 
31 An industry sector is a scattered collection of businesses united by a set of common commercial interests 
and challenges (or identities). With respect to a sector-solution approach, the ‘cluster’ is a tool for the 
agglomeration of these like businesses (e.g., industrial parks and districts and “information districts”). The 
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in the extension of his influential advocacy of and planning for interdependent ‘clusters’ or a 
“sector-solution” approach, which is rooted in strategic initiative
 32 (Center for an Urban Future, 
2000; Harrison and Glasmeier, 1997) (Fig. 2.3). 
a. Clusters: A Sector-oriented Economic Development Approach 
Porter’s concepts of ‘clusters’ have a long history that predates his writing (Harrison and 
Glasmeier, 1997).
 As early as the nineteenth century, economist Alfred Marshall coined the term 
“industrial district” to describe the concentration of cutlery makers in Sheffield and the cotton 
mills in Lancashire, England (James Surowieki, The New Yorker, April, 2000). According to 
Surowieki (2000), industrial districts enjoy the same economies of scale that other “giant” 
companies do not. Annalee Saxenian (1994) illustrates that among the benefits that outweigh the 
costs of rising real estate and the contention between suppliers is “specialized knowledge”: one’s 
specialization attracts another’s specialized knowledge. In other words, a successful ‘cluster’ can 
become, to borrow from Surowieki (2000), a ‘brand’ in its own right (e.g., Silicon Valley (CA), 
Route 128 (MA) and Research Triangle Park (NC)). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Center for an Urban Future (2000) argues that a sector-oriented economic development approach, premised 
on working closely with industry leaders, will help a city design “smart” policy (i.e., economically efficient 
from the standpoint of tax abatements), which in turn helps many other businesses. This argument is set in 
the context of costly approaches to economic development, which target individual companies instead of 
industry sectors; a practice that was widely perceived as ‘smokestack chasing’ in the manufacturing-based 
economy (1938-74); the expression has been re-coined ‘chip-chasing’ under current ‘new economic’ 
conditions (Center for an Urban Future, 2000. “The Sector Solution: Building a Broader Base for the New 
Economy,” January). See also Eisinger’s (1988) “demand-side” terminology, in The Rise of the 
Entrepreneurial State. 
32 Strategic initiative refers to the “organizing capacity” for information generation, analysis and 
forecasting; technical and managerial capacity of local enterprise; economic and technical competence; 
fostering of linkages between R&D and new production; and, the training of the labor force (Kirwan 1987, 
21). See also “Connecticut Inner City Business Strategy” and “Governor’s Council on Economic 
Competitiveness and Technology,” in “Industry Cluster Progress Report” 1999, CT.; Forrant and Flynn, 
1997; and, Choosing to Compete, MA, 1993. 
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A strategic “sector-solution” approach, according to the Center for an Urban Future, 
starts with a survey of the local economy and the “targeting” of industry sectors. Second, a local 
group, typically of a public-private partnership or a chamber of commerce, designs and 
implements the projects by researching market trends and tackling “anti-business” regulations 
that may impede economic development. The Center emphasizes that listening to the industry’s 
specific needs in this process is more important than the way in which a “sector-solution” 
approach is designed and implemented (Voytek and Ledebur 1997, 191). Voytek and Ledebur 
(1997) add that a “sector-solution” approach is and should be a component of a strategic 
multidimensional initiative, while stressing that effective “industry-targeting” requires expertise. 
Unfortunately, however, Voytek and Ledebur are unable to provide any clear guidelines on how 
to integrate “industry-targeting” with a comprehensive citywide economic development plan. 
 
“Choosing to Compete” and the “Pioneer Valley Plan for Progress” 
Choosing to Compete (EOEA, 1993) and the Pioneer Valley Plan for Progress
33 (PVPC, 
1994) are two strategic initiatives that follow the same basic premise. The Weld-Cellucci 
                                                       
33 The strategic goals of the regional plan include developing a regional identity that celebrates growing 
diversity, connecting communities and fostering economic growth through collaboration, and integrating 
university resources into the regional economy for direct economic benefit (e.g., university as developer or 
university partnerships—John P. Thurber, Thompson Edison State College, jthurber@tesc.edu: Policy 
Partnerships: Opportunities and Dilemmas for Cities and Universities). 
−  Maximize job expansion and retention by targeting the region’s export industries. 
−  Recognize the special importance of core cities to the overall health of the region 
−  Foster positive business climate through the creation of (assurances) capital and sustaining its 
availability (e.g., revolving loan programs, community banks, etc.); industry-led job training (See Best 
and Forrant, 2000, the ‘Machine Action Program’); and, streamlining the permitting process and 
regulations. 
The metalworking industry in Western Massachusetts consists of approximately 300 small and medium-
size firms, employing 11,000 workers and representing almost twenty-five percent of the region’s total 
manufacturing base. It offers one example of the potential usefulness of a revolving loan program; samples 
of the region’s metal products include molds for the plastics industry, timing chains for the Saturn 
26  
Administration published Choosing to Compete in an effort to outline categories for industrial 
development in each region of the Commonwealth, including the Pioneer Valley.
34 The initiative 
identifies “critical” industries as those that bring money into the region; an industry in which a 
‘critical mass’ of firms already exists; an industry responsive to technological change; and, one 
that provides upward career mobility. Industries in the Hampden and Hampshire Counties include 
paper and allied products; health and allied services; fabricated metals; industrial machinery and 
equipment; and, printing and publishing. All of these industries are manufacturing-related with 
the exception of the health industry. Emergent industries include polymers and advanced 
materials; computer software and development;
35 aircraft and environmental engineering and 




                                                                                                                                                              
automobile, Craftsman tools for Sears department stores, and industrial saw blades shipped to more than 
thirty countries world wide (PVPC, 1994). 
34 The Pioneer Valley region consists of 44 cities and towns comprising of Hampden and Hampshire 
Counties. Interstate 91 (completed in 1970) has unified the region together with the 25 communities of 
Franklin County. It also has expanded the Valley’s geographic definition as an economic unit, maximizing 
on the economic potential for each city and town will be contingent on inter-municipal relations and 
regional collaboration; the Pioneer Valley has a population of 608,479 as the fourth largest metropolitan 
area in New England (U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 2000). 
35 Polymers and advanced materials and computer software and development are both expected to grow 
from UMass spin-offs (EOEA, 1993). 
36Millitech (S. Deerfield) specializes in making devices that measure changes in atmospheric conditions. 
Instrument Technology started out by making jet engines and nuclear power plants; it has since then 
entered the medical market through the manufacturing of boroscopes. Hutchins Tool and Engineering 
Company (Springfield) started out by making products for the aerospace industry and it is now fabricating 
a product that helps medical technicians administer Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation. American Saw and 
Manufacturing Company (Springfield) have an international distribution network, including a distribution 
facility in Japan. Thermaflo (Springfield) has created an effective, low-cost technology that will reverse the 
effects of chlorofluorocarbons (EOEA, 1993). Furthermore, the Northeast food wholesaler/distributor, 
Springfield Food Service Corp, was recently bought out by Performance Food Group, Inc—a food 
wholesaler based in Richmond (VA) that also bought out Empire Seafood Holding Corp last April (Boston 
Business Journal, July 23, 2001). As a result, the old Springfield Foodservice Corp facilities in Downtown 
Springfield were rehabilitated and expanded by the new owner. 
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The Pioneer Valley Plan for Progress included a research phase, which produced the 
Economic Assessment of the Pioneer Valley (April, 1994) and three ‘Economic Summits.’ The 
first summit had approximately 300 registered participants—each group discussing a topic related 
to elements of the economy. Craig Moore of the University of Massachusetts Amherst described 
the importance of export industries, emphasizing that local (or domestic) firms will only survive 
if export industries are bringing money from out-of-region markets into the region (Moore, New 
Economic Reality: Massachusetts, 1994).
37 
 
Additional strategic initiatives include the Hartford Inner City Business Strategy 
Initiative (DECD and ICIC, 1999), which has assembled corporate, government and community 
leadership. The undertaking has produced a detailed analysis of Hartford’s inner city economy—
based on industry clusters that drive its growth, and the strategies and action plans that facilitate 
it. An economic development and job creation strategy also has been initiated by the City of 
Springfield. It encompasses six programs: Fiber Optics – Telecommunications (i.e., Springfield 
‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’); Riverfront/Basketball Hall of Fame; Downtown 
Revitalization; Industrial Land Development; the UMass/Baystate Health System Springfield 
Initiative; and, the Economic Development Incentive Program (City of Springfield, 2001). All of 
the action items are discussed in the city’s urban-centric “Downtown Master Plan,” promoting the 
development of the new Springfield Basketball Hall of Fame (City of Springfield, 2001b). 
 
At the State level, the Dot.commonwealth Coalition aims to brand Massachusetts as the 
center for technology leadership and innovation. Affiliates include the Western Massachusetts 
                                                       
37 The Berkshire Plastics Network (BPN), for instance, was organized in 1987 and has thirty-five firms in 
the organization. These firms believe that sound economic development begins with locally owned and 
operated businesses. BPN’s interim executive director represents the interests of the network and promotes 
new developments that will help the industry participate more fully in their communities by competing 
more effectively in the global economy (PVPC, 1994). 
28  
Technology Business Council, Massachusetts Technology Collaborative, Massachusetts 
Biotechnology Council, Massachusetts Alliance for Economic Development, Cape Code 
Technology Council, Inc., and the Berkshire Technology Alliance. In Western Massachusetts, 
additional ‘high-tech’ business and economic development corporations and strategic initiatives 
include the Pioneer Valley Life Sciences Initiative,
38 Regional Technology Alliance (RTA), 
Telitcom Development Corporation, Westover Metropolitan Development Corporation (WMDC) 
and Westmass Area Development Corporation. 
b. Free Market Unpredictability 
The demand for ‘competitive advantage’ lends itself to entrepreneurial planning. Given 
the unpredictable nature of a free market economy, the question for some economists and 
planners remains whether a long-term strategic approach is a viable option for economic 
development (Goldsmith, 1997).
39 From the standpoint of an e-business consultant, Larry Downes 
(2001) writes that obstacles to business development for most companies fall into two categories: 
problems internal to the company and those forces external to its industry. In response to the poor 
performance of private sector organizations, Michael Porter (1997) argues that by “ignoring 
strategy, many companies have undermined the structure of their industries” (Downes, 2001). In 
other words, these companies have not recognized their “unmet market demand.” For Porter, 
economic development is possible provided the government concerns itself with the creation of a 
                                                       
38 The Pioneer Valley Life Sciences Initiative is a partnership dedicated to expanding the state’s capacity 
for high-quality R&D in the life sciences. It is an outgrowth of on-going research collaborations between 
scientists at UMass Amherst and Baystate Medical Center in Springfield. The initiative expects to attract 
commercial investment in molecular biology, medical instrumentation, bioinformatics and biomedical 
engineering, integrating polymer and computer sciences (The Commonwealth Coalition, Springfield, MA, 
June 1, 2001). RTA and the Technology Enterprise Council (TEC) desire to take this a step further in order 
to assist in the transformation of traditional industries (e.g., fabricated metals) and the promotion of 
emerging industries (e.g. polymers and advanced materials) through “technology networks;” technology 
transfer between the two would promote, for example, the innovative development of metal molds for the 
plastics industry. 
39 See also Voytek and Ledbur, 1997; Blair and Kumar, 1997; and, Taylor, 1997. 
29  
strong ‘business climate’ (e.g., taxes, insurance, permitting, etc.) and leaves the creation and 
support of economically viable businesses to private sector organizations. He adds government 
should refrain from the direct involvement in, or intervention of business growth. Likewise, 
quasi-government organizations (e.g., CBOs/CDCs or “third-force organizations) should service 
the community through job-referrals, “community attitude” development, site acquisition and 
development (Porter, 1995). However, given the accelerating pace of an incessantly changing 
market, Downes (2001) argues that the use of long-term planning can do more harm than it can 
do well. To this end, David Bartik (1990), offers the “market failure approach.” According to 
David Adams (1994, 33), “market failure happens if the functioning of the market is distorted by 




Regardless of either perspective, a resource-efficient development strategy must 
recognize both the unmet local and regional market demand in order to trigger a new market or 
revitalize an existing local economic base. Porter’s “direct government involvement” in the 
‘competitive advantage’ of the inner city does not oppose a proactive government role in 
entrepreneurial planning. In fact, both roles should produce a sustained and widespread private 
market reaction, which stresses upon entrepreneurialism. The actions generally taken by local 
government, in this view, respond to business development demands such as financial assistance, 
and employment training and assistance programs through partnership with State and Federal 
authorities (Kirwan 1987, 22). Porter’s criticism of “direct government involvement” is instead 
                                                       
40 Neo-classical welfare economists believe that it is impossible to help one person without making the 
other worse off. This is known as Pareto optimality, where it is believed that [competitive] markets 
automatically achieve this condition or “market failure.” This is provided, however, that no external 
distortions exist. For example, Bartik (1990) refers to these distortions as the ability to influence the market 
by recognizing the unmet demand and incentivizing it in order to create a new market demand. 
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directed at those public organizations that elect to do this by continuously increasing social 
investment. 
 
Springfield’s ‘Machine Action Program’ and the Massachusetts Economic Development 
Incentive Program 
Michael Best and Robert Forrant (2000) describe the public proactive role in the 
industrial modernization program of the Machine Action Project (MAP). MAP was a community 
and industry-based undertaking in Western Massachusetts that worked with hundreds of 
metalworking firms.
41 The program helped to “leverage” the “fabricated metals” industry sector 
with public finance and encouraged industry-led workforce training. MAP also functioned as a 
business retention team. Other business retention teams in the City of Springfield were expanded 
upon when the Pioneer Valley Plan for Progress created the Economic Development Partners 
group, the Plan for Progress Cabinet, and the Retention and Expansion Committee of the 
Springfield Chamber of Commerce in 1994 (PVPC, 1994). The Springfield Chamber of 
Commerce currently monitors, evaluates and supports local businesses that are part of the 
regional economic base. It surveys regional businesses on a regular basis and offers a model for 
the development of additional business retention teams. 
 
The short-term strategies (1995-1997) of the Pioneer Valley Plan for Progress (PVPC, 
1994) focused on telecommunications capability and recommended the use of regional 
incubators
42 for the identification and concentration of businesses requiring strong ‘telecom’ 
infrastructure. These companies include financial office operations, companies needing an 800-
                                                       
41 See also ‘Manufacturing Partnership of Western Massachusetts Initiative’ (PVPC, 1994). 
42 Incubated companies and laboratories transfer information, and exchange and develop their skills. 
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number marketing center, cable television programmers, long-distance learning programs and 
software firms. The Springfield Chamber of Commerce and the Pioneer Valley Economic 
Council led this effort in 1994.
43 Shortly thereafter, STCC created the college’s Technology Park 
in 1996 and the Northeast Center for Telecommunications Technologies (NCTT) in 1997. 
Located at the STCC – Technology Park are the ‘Springfield Enterprise Center’ (SEC), under 
which the STCC Entrepreneurial Institute provides credit courses through the STCC – School of 
Continuing Education and the ‘Center for Business and Technology’ (CBT). Among them are the 
‘Student Incubator,’ which provides young entrepreneurs with an opportunity to incubate their 
businesses and the Deliso Videoconferencing Center. 
 
One of the important aspects behind strategic initiatives is knowledge creation. ‘High-
tech’ incubators like STCC – Technology Park are essential to this process through the local and 
regional attraction, retention and training of a skilled work force. In fact, STCC has partnered 
with other education institutions and private information technology (IT) vendors in the region to 
train workers at key IT companies through State and Federal levered finance.
44 Roger Miller and 
Marcel Côté (1985) have reinforced the importance of ‘high-tech’ incubators after conducting a 
survey of ‘high-tech’ ‘clusters’ in North America and Europe. They have found that a ‘high-tech’ 
                                                       
43 The endeavour has since then developed into the ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program.’ 
44 Established ‘high-tech’ incubators, such as STCC – Technology Park, will attract funding from State and 
Federal sources like the “Information and Telecommunications Technology (IT
2) Project.” IT
2 is funded 
with a $15 million grant from the U.S. Department of Labor. STCC, Capital Region Community College 
(CT), Greenfield Community College and various private IT vendors have partnered with the IT
2 project in 
order to train workers at key technology companies in the region. IT
2 is also one of two regional joint 
ventures behind the Hartford-Springfield region’s three Workforce Investment Boards (WIB). The WIBs 
were created by the new Federal Workforce Investment Act to oversee all federally funded workforce-
training programs, training an estimated 966,000 workers who make their living in the ‘Knowledge 
Corridor.’ All information regarding the WIBs is available through their seven One-Stop Career Centers 
throughout the region (e.g. FutureWorks and CareerPoint)  (New England Developments, Policy Issues 
Shaping the Regional Economy, October, 2001). 
32  
incubator together with a strong ‘business climate’ and a ‘quality of life’ that attracts professional 
and skilled workers are essential to the growth of ‘high-tech’ enterprise. 
 
Combined research and development (R&D) resources for the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst and STCC has also created and fostered new business development and 
workforce training. Some of these resources have been allocated to the manufacturing businesses 
of the ‘Western Massachusetts Manufacturing Partnership,’ by “leveraging” its investments with 
private, State and Federal support. Long-term recommendations from the Springfield 
Biotechnology Summary Report (UMass CED, 1998) defends the need for a UMass-Springfield 
research institute and training facility in Springfield; yet, there remains to be seen whether 
Springfield will have a physical UMass presence in the near future. 
 
Other programs attempting to induce a private-market reaction include the Massachusetts 
Economic Development Incentive Program (EDIP). EDIP offers the City of Springfield an 
assortment of economic development incentives for the packaging of development grants and 
subsidies. The Commonwealth has designated the city as an Economic Target Zone (ETZ) under 
the EDIP, within which three Economic Opportunity Areas (EOAs) have been identified. 
“Certified Projects” within an EOA are eligible for a five percent Investment Tax Credit, a ten 
percent Abandoned Building Tax Credit, priority for State capital funding, and various municipal 
tax benefits such as Tax Increment Financing (TIF), which has a public and private investment 
component. The City of Springfield Office of Economic Development and the Massachusetts 
Economic Development Office also encourages business growth through the Enterprise 
Community Grant and the Section 108 Loan Guarantees. Additional funding sources include city 
and State bonds, and Federal grants such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s Brownfields 
Grant and the Brownfields Economic Development Initiative (BEDI) (City of Springfield, 
2001b). 
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c. ‘Competitive advantage’ 
Michael Porter (1995) offers two models to inner city economic development in his 
widely discussed article “The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City,” (Fig. 2.4). Throughout 
the article, Porter stresses how an economic rather than a social perspective must be adopted for 
successful inner city economic development. In other words, he places the focus of the ‘new’ 
model on the private sector rather than on the social services of the ‘old’ model, discouraging 
cities that continue to perpetually increase social investment as a vehicle for inner city economic 
development. 
 
Porter (1995) also describes the inner city in terms of advantages and disadvantages or 
“barriers” to economic development. Among the advantages are strategic location, local market 
demand, integration with regional ‘clusters,’ and human resources. To a city’s disadvantage are 
building costs, land vacancy, acquisition (litigation) and cleanup, security, infrastructure, lack of 
venture capital, and other costs like high-priced utilities, insurance and permitting. The 
‘competitive advantage’ situates itself on the exploitation of the advantages, while lessening the 
barriers to economic development with private sector resolve rather than social programs, 
subsidies, and direct government involvement, which have been “piecemeal and fragmented at 
best.” Porter’s ‘new’ role for the private sector must do what it does best: create and support 
economically viable businesses that are built on “true” economic advantage. Additionally, the 
local government must shift its focus from direct involvement and intervention in the private 
sector toward the creation of a favorable business environment (i.e., ‘business climate’). 
 
Finally, Porter’s account of CBOs/CDCs underestimates the growing importance of these 
“third force organizations” when they are described as having “few notable [Italics added] 
successes” (Zukin 1995, 138-9; Tietz 2001, 291-3). Because of the wide range of CBOs/CDCs, 
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Porter does not make any general recommendations. Instead, he offers four principles: identify 
the unique competitive advantages to CBOs/CDCs, encourage positive workforce and community 
attitude development, provide work-readiness and job-referral assistance, and facilitate 
commercial site improvement and development.
45 Altogether, Porter emphasizes that the private 
sector should lead economic revival and the public sector should support them. In so doing, cities 
embrace a “rational economic strategy” that can overcome the “intolerable costs of outdated 
approaches.” 
 
Regional Technology Alliance and the Technology Enterprise Council 
An example of the potential behind a “third force organization” is the Regional 
Technology Alliance (RTA) of Western Massachusetts. RTA has fostered public-private-
partnerships by bringing together industry, higher education and public and private non-profit 
sectors. In doing so, it aims to ensure that the region is taking advantage of available ‘high-tech’ 
development funds and existing ‘high-tech’ industry networks.
46 The Interstate 91 corridor has 
significant telecommunications resources through its research and education institutions, and 
‘high-tech’ industries. According to RTA, however, these assets are not “connected”
47 to the 
industrial base of the Pioneer Valley as well as they could be. RTA’s initial assessment of 
Western Massachusetts and the Pioneer Valley resulted in a number of key findings. One of the 
                                                       
45 The actions taken by these local economic development groups include the removal of barriers to 
enterprise, expansion and employment, fostering competition between existing businesses, supporting 
product development or technological innovation, establishing local development corporations, supporting 
and encouraging the development of new companies, and procurement programs that help the local 
economy (Kirwan 1987, 23). 
46 RTA is comprised of higher education, the private sector, public utilities and private non-profit entities. 
The organizations’s founding partners include UMass Amherst, Western Massachusetts Electric Company 
(WMEC), EDC, Pioneer Valley Plan for Progress, Mass Ventures, STCC and numerous industry leaders. 
47 See City of Springfield, 2001. “Promoting Springfield: Images and Phrases,” in Master Plan Summary 
for the Metro Center. 
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findings describes Western Massachusetts industry in a critical period of development. That is, 
both traditional and emerging industries have recognized the importance of technology, but where 
and how they coincide with each other remains to be further investigated (e.g., crossing the 




With the help of a $600,000 grant from the National Science Foundation, RTA has 
deployed technology resources in support of the region’s industries as a means of addressing the 
necessary “technology networks.” Driven by industry participants, the alliance has created the 
first “technology network” between Yankee Environmental, Thomcast, Cyberlore, Millitech and 
Hotroof, Inc. The “technology network” is appropriately known as the Steering Committee of the 
Information Technology and Communications Cluster. Together with the Western Massachusetts 
Technology Business Council and Information Technology,
49 both have merged to form the 
Technology Enterprise Council (TEC), which will provide business development services to 
information and communication technology-driven companies. 
d. The Ensuing Debate 
The ensuing academic debate on Porter’s theory of inner city ‘competitive advantage’ is 
worth noting. The articles that followed included Timothy Bates’ “Michael Porter’s Conservative 
                                                       
48 RTA commissioned Battelle Memorial Institute of Ohio to help assemble the technology networks for 
the region, assessing core technologies of industry and higher education as well as identifying networks for 
collaboration and developing a work plan for each network. Battelle interviewed 51firms in the region 
(identified by RTA) and 74 industry representatives on core technology competencies. Battelle also 
interviewed four higher educational institutions for a total of 44 faculty and administrators. Centered on the 
results of these interviews, Battelle held four focus group meetings with a total of 54 attendees, 
representing a cross-section of the region’s public, private and non-profit economic development 
organizations. 
49 The Western Massachusetts Technology Business Council and Information Technology were established 
in 1995 as the Western Massachusetts Software Association. 
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Urban Agenda Will Not Revitalize America’s Inner Cities: What Will?” and, Bennett Harrison 
and Amy Glasmeier’s “Response: Why Business Alone Won’t Redevelop the Inner City: A 
Friendly Critique of Michael Porter’s Approach to Urban Revitalization.” Bates (1997) argues 
that Porter’s sweeping generalizations about the causes of urban decay as it relates to “outdated 
approaches” of government and “third force organizations” requires scrutiny. The difference 
between the two models leave the government to appear as the “main culprit” and the non-profits 
as “well-intended idiots,” while the private sector “emerges relatively unmuddied.” According to 
Bates, all three of these parties are far from consistent and “any analysis in so few pages is 
superficial”—offering a case study of Mesbic Ventures
50 to challenge Porter’s portrayal of policy 
initiatives in the 1960s as entirely geared to social policy. Bates applauds Porter, however, for 
stimulating a productive debate and encouraging businesses to rethink inner city investment 
opportunities. Harrison and Glasmeier (1997) likewise argue that Porter’s concepts of ‘clusters,’ 
and industrial and business parks have a long history that predates his writing. Nonetheless, 
Porter’s incorporation of these elements, for Harrison and Glasmeier, is valuable, but his neglect 
of the positive contributions of local governments and “third force organizations” is not. 
 
Both articles address the positive contributions of CBOs/CDCs and local government in 
general, with an understanding that each has had varying levels of success. The growing numbers 
of such services, especially in neighborhoods of color where issues of equality, distributive 
justice, and power are often debated, stands in great conflict with the entrepreneurial shift from 
‘welfare’ issues to economic regeneration as the key policy issue in urban revitalization (Alonso, 
2001; Baxter, 2001; Harrison, 2001; Yaro, 2001). 
                                                       
50 Mesbic Ventures is a for-profit investment company in Dallas, Texas; it was incorporated in 1970. 
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Figure 
2.1: Keys to the Old and New [American] Economies 
Keys to the Old and New [American] Economies
Economy-Wide Characteristics
ISSUE OLD ECONOMY NEW ECONOMY
Markets Stable Dynamic












Production Mass Production Flexible Production
Key Factor of 
Production Capital/Labor Innovation/Knowledge
Key Technology Driver Mechanization Digitazation










Relations With Other 




Principal Policy Goal Full Employment





Requisite Education A Skill Lifelong Learning
Labor-Management 
Relations Adversarial Collaborative
Nature of Employment Stable














Source: The Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), (2002). Technology, Innovation, and New 
Economy Project, www.neweconomyindex.org; and, Kotler, Philip, (1993). Marketing Places: 
Attracting Investment, Industry and Tourism to Cities, States, and Nations 
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Figure 
2.2: Characteristics of Old and New Economies  
Characteristics of Old and New Economies
Characteristics Old New
Scope Domestic Global
Driving Force Mass Production Technology, innovation
Resource Capital Knowledge, information
Jobs Stable, large firms Dynamic, smaller firms
Organizations Centralized/hierarchical Matrix, fluid, decentralized
Markets Stable Fluid
Workers Uneducated, unskilled Educated, skilled, adaptive
Tasks Simple, physical Complex, intellectual, participatory
Technology Mechanical Electronic, biological
Emphasis Predictability Innovation, creativity
Information flow Top-down Bottom-up, interactive
Opportunities Limited, fixed Fluid, rotational, mobile
Business/government Minimal intervention Cooperation, partnership
Symbol Smokestack Computer
Source: Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Change Masters 
 
2.3: A Sector Solution Approach: Compare and Contrast  
Traditional Tax Abatement Sector Solution
Public dollars spent on one company Public and private dollars invested in an entire 
sector
Defensive response to a company's demands Government-initiated investigation and 
response to an industry's needs
Large, one-shot tax abatements Small, long-term investments
No guarentee of new jobs Accountability measures to ensure new jobs 
are being created
Strategy largely determined by government Strategy determined in collaboration with 
government, businesses and other local 
leaders
Central administration Local administration
Elite assistance to massive corporations Focused on all businesses in the city
Success defined as preventing loss Success defined as growth
A Sector-Solution Approach: Compare and Contrast
Source: New York/New Jobs, “The Sector Solution,” January 2000/ www.nycfuture.org 
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Figure 
2.4: City Economic Development: Two Models 
Old Model New Model
Social: redistribute wealth Economic: create wealth
Government and social service organizations Private sector
Subsidized businesses Profitable businesses
Isolation from the larger economy Integration with the regional economy
Companies that serve the local community Companies that are export oriented*
Skilled and experienced minorities engaged Skilled and experienced minorities engaged
in the social service sector in building businesses
Special institutions created Mainstream, private sector institutions
enlisted
Inner city disadvantages counterbalanced Inner city advantages addressed directly
with subsidies
Government involved directly in providing  Government focused on improving the 
services or funding environment for business
 Inner City Economic Development
Source: Porter, Michael E. "The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City" 
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CHAPTER III 
 A “GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE” 
Before the ‘telecom’ downturn in 1999-2000, the market analysts at Grubb & Ellis, Inc. 
(2001) forecasted that the high demand for older business, industrial and retail space for telecom-
related facilities would offer thousands of real estate opportunities. They foresaw the next round 
of economic expansion in mid-size U.S. cities, many of which would have a “wealth” of older 
downtown office buildings suitable to meet the new demand (e.g., switching stations, telecom 
hotels
51 and back office space). They also forecasted a steadfast increase in demand for ‘telecom’ 
space despite new technological advancements that would continue to inevitability reduce square-
footage requirements. Consequently, the over-estimated market was quickly oversupplied with 
‘telecom’ space. Last year’s first quarter vacancy rates, in this sector of the real estate market, 
was an astounding 44.6 percent (Grubb & Ellis, 2001). The second quarter closed at 38.9 percent, 
but vacancies still exceed 30 percent in most major real estate markets. This drop may seem 
optimistic, but it does not indicate any market improvement. Rather the drop reflects tenants who, 
in previous quarters, had pre-leased space that was subsequently occupied after construction 
(Miller, 2001). By comparison, the national office vacancy rate at the end of the first quarter was 
10.1 percent, while the industrial vacancy rate was approximately 6 percent. National vacancies 
for office and industrial space in the second quarter were 10.1 and 6 percent respectively. The 
outlook is clear: the excess supply of ‘telecom’ space will need to be burned off before additional 
                                                       
51 Tenant requirements for these ‘telecom’-related facilities include the proximity of fiber optic lines, a 
floor load capacity of 125 lbs. / sqft. and a minimum twelve-foot ceiling height with few windows, 
redundant power sources (i.e., a 480-volt power supply, 960-volts is preferred), space for fuel storage and 
backup generators, lines-of-site for rooftop antennas, and advanced fire and security systems. Buildings that 
meet all of these requirements are rare. When they do meet these criteria, they often command rents well 
above those in surrounding office buildings (i.e., anywhere between $5.00 - $45.00 / sqft.). However, a 
‘telecom-hotel’ will only employ one to two individuals. Therefore, the “excess” of planned ‘telecom-
hotel’ space can create “dead zones” in areas where there is a need for revitalization. If these areas are not 
accompanied by significant concentrations of employment, then it might discourage the development of 
office and retail space in that area (Grubb&Ellis, 2001). 
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construction or conversions should take place. “With the evaporation of venture capital and 
poorly capitalized telecoms, it is unlikely that demand for space will equal that seen in 1999 and 
2000” (Grubb & Ellis, 2001; Miller, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, the long-term ‘high-tech’ tenant demand is uncertain as well as the amount 
of fiber that will be needed. Apparently as new products and services enter the market, it seems 
that there will be an increasing push toward efficiency and cost savings. This implies that 
businesses will likely share telecommunications infrastructure
52 and further reduce the demand 
for ‘telecom’ space. Nevertheless, the IT market is in its infancy, continuously restructuring and 
generating new corporate consolidations. Moreover, “telecom’ companies are the utility 
companies of tomorrow—there will always be a demand for telecom services, especially as 
telecom products advance and grow.” This also will be accompanied by a long-term demand for 
faster and cheaper communication systems. Together, both will generate a steady growth in urban 
telecommunication–oriented development (Grubb & Ellis, 2001; Miller, 2001). 
A. Springfield in a Regional Context 
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a massive economic restructuring of local and 
regional economies in 1991. This was a major blow on U.S. mid-size cities after years of national 
defense buildup during the 1980s. Massachusetts, at this time, was nationally ranked third ($ 
value) in prime defense contracts as well as third in the portion of private sector jobs sustained on 
this Federal capital. The following decade saw these contracts decline by 46%
53 between 1989 
                                                       
52 The increasing concentration of telecommunication companies at the STCC – Technology Park has 
created a telecommunications “hotel” (not to be confused with ‘telecom-hotel’). This ‘high-tech’ incubator 
allows companies to rent telecommunications capacity from other companies in the park as necessary. 
53 Defense spending is a significant contributor to technological innovation. It funds 82 percent of all 
engineering research, 75 percent of mechanical engineering, 73 percent of metallurgy and material, 55 
percent of computer science and 28 percent of mechanics research. Prime contracts in Massachusetts 
(primarily electronic and communications systems) were administered under the Research, Development, 
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and 1999. However, the economic impact from this disinvestment had an uneven affect on 
Massachusetts as some areas experienced economic growth and others fell behind (UMass 
Donahue Institute 2000, 5). Those communities that have fallen behind are typically characterized 
by factors of race, low educational attainment and insufficient employment training, which 
altogether might contribute to high unemployment and poverty. These factors are also typical of 
economic bases unable to restructure according to new economic challenges. According to the 
Donahue Institute (2000), these conditions persist despite their proximity to modern technology 
infrastructure (i.e., “digital divide”). 
1. New Atlantic Triangle 
The dissolution of traditional economic and political boundaries are among the more 
characteristic of urban economic transformations in the ‘new’ economy. Economic boundaries 
have become increasingly more flexible and penetrable, while political ones have maintained 
various degrees of rigidity. Under this pattern of development, metro regions are increasingly 
structured on an interconnected network of urban-economic centers and corridors. These 
configurations of flexible economic and political continuity or super regions are a product of the 
new global age. They offer a global ‘competitive advantage’ above the rest because of their 
massive concentrations of economic, institutional and cultural resources (CT21, 2001), much like 
the Boston, Albany and New York (City) metro regions of the ‘New Atlantic Triangle’ (Fig. 3.1). 
 
The pattern of economic activity in the ‘New Atlantic Triangle’ was commonly dispersed 
among a series of large city centers. Today, it is centered primarily in the core metropolitan areas 
of New York, Boston and Hartford. Within these areas are large concentrations of services or 
                                                                                                                                                              
Test and Evaluation program (RDT&E), contributing to its reputation as a ‘high-tech’ state. However, the 
RDT&E budget for Massachusetts has declined by 10% in 1990 to 6.1% in 1999, respectively declining by 
by an overall 12% nationwide. 
43  
‘clusters,’
54 which branch outward along the interstate corridors (CT21, 2001). For instance, the 
Hartford-Springfield metro area captures six corporation headquarters in six of the 62 Fortune 
500 industry categories
55 (Fig. 3.2). If all insurance sub-categories were combined for this region, 
the insurance industry would be the largest category with three headquarters.
56 While Connecticut 
has never had a “Silicon Valley” or a RT. 128, Interstate 91
57 could provide this type of location 
(i.e., ‘New England’s Knowledge Corridor’) (CT21, 2001). In fact, Hartford ranked 17
th out of 
the 40 top office and R&D real estate markets in the Northeast, placing the city among the top 8-
10% of markets nationwide (Table 3.1) (Expansion Management Magazine, 2000). Traditional 
economic activity in Massachusetts and Connecticut continues to be an integral component in 
each of the State economies despite accompanying declines in manufacturing. Nevertheless, the 
transformation of manufacturing to an R&D and a services-based economy in both States has 
been supported by an institutional and social structure that provides financial resources, training 
and consulting.
58 This transformation has generally lent itself to value-added manufacturing and a 
higher demand on specialized labor skills (CT21, 2001). 
                                                       
54 These ‘clusters’ account for financial, educational, medical and research institutions, transportation 
facilities, labor pools, and managerial services. 
55 The data reported for both Hartford and Springfield Metro Areas uses the 1997 federal Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) definition; this is the most current of Hartford and Springfield MSAs. The 
Springfield Metro Area includes 28 of the 43 municipalities in Hampden and Hampshire Counties and 
Sunderland (Franklin County). 
56 In the remaining New York and Boston metro areas, the major industrial categories are “large financial 
group” (e.g., commercial banks and securities firms) and “commercial banks” respectively. New York has 
the largest grouping in the nation with 36 of the 62 Fortune 500 categories (CT21, 2001). This makes the 
New York office market the largest in the ‘New Atlantic Triangle,’ leaving northern New Jersey and 
Boston office markets as the second and third largest in the Triangle respectively. The New York metro 
area also has the most dynamic industrial market, respectively leaving Boston and Hartford as the second 
and third largest markets (Tables 3-1, 3-2); this industrial concentration is centered on Northern New 
Jersey; nationally speaking, only Los Angeles has a larger market. 
57 Interstate 91 is the principle corridor that bisects the Triangle southeast from Hartford-Springfield to 
Stamford-Bridgeport and New Haven via New London-Norwich, CT. 
58 This institutional and social structure includes organizations such as STCC, UMass Amherst, Telitcom, 
Technology Enterprise Council, Mass Ventures, Chambers of Commerce, FutureWorks and CareerPoint. 
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2. New England’s Knowledge Corridor 
‘New England’s Knowledge Corridor’
59 is comprised of the Hampden and Hampshire 
counties in Massachusetts and the Hartford and Tolland counties in Connecticut. The impetus 
behind ‘New England’s Knowledge Corridor’ presumes that its sum will be larger than its 
component parts (Table 3.2). In aggregated form, the four counties constitute 85 cities and towns 
with a total population of 1.6 million (U.S. Census, 2000). This makes the ‘Knowledge Corridor’ 
the second most populated region in New England, accounting for 39,405 businesses and an 
approximate $2.3 billion in annual business-to-business trade flows (UMass and UConn, 2001) 
(Fig 3.3). 
 
According to the Milken Institute, both Massachusetts and Connecticut together with 
California, Colorado and Washington are the five top-ranking states most likely to succeed in the 
‘new’ economy. Research and development dollars, percentage of advanced degrees, number of 
patents issued, venture capital investment, and business start-ups were among the Institute’s 
criteria or indicators of future growth. The report also emphasized that only those countries, states 
and metro areas that are able to create ‘clusters’ of ‘high-tech’ industries will prosper in the new 
global age.  
 
According to the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), Hartford ranked 22
nd among fifty of 
the largest metro areas nationwide in a study
60 that surveyed industries for workforce education 
                                                       
59 The ‘Knowledge Corridor’ was initiated by the Hartford-Springfield Economic Partnership (HSEP), 
which was established in 1999 with the support of Northeast Utilities. HSEP envisions the ‘Knowledge 
Corridor’ as a regional entity that is intent on achieving economies of scale, while simultaneously helping 
to promote the area. Its name has been attributed to the high concentration of universities and colleges in 
the region. 
60 PPI and Case Western Reserve University’s Center for Regional Economic Issues jointly carried out the 
study titled “The Metropolitan New Economic Index: Benchmarking Economic Transformation in the 
Nation’s Metro Areas. 
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levels, telecom service providers, patents issued, and the number of science and engineering 
graduates among other indicators. In fact, according to the American Electronic Association and 
NASDAQ on ‘high-tech’ industrial development, 28.9 percent of all jobs created in the metro 
Hartford area were ‘high-tech,’ ranking it 2
nd in the nation for ‘high-tech’ job growth (Expansion 
Magazine, March 2001). However, ‘high-tech’ jobs in the City of Hartford only represent 9.7 
percent of all city jobs. Furthermore, the total number of ‘high-tech’ jobs between 1992-1997 
suffered a 0.2 percent decrease, while suburbs registered a 12.0 percent increase. This reinforces 
the decentralizing effects of the ‘new’ urban-economic transformation that has been heightened 
by advances in telecommunications technology and its distribution. 
 
In addition to the population decreases registered for Hartford (-3.14% - 1998-2003) and 
Springfield (-3.1% - 1990-2000), the prospect for telecommunications as a catalyst for inner city 
urban-economic revitalization is simple. Critically, much of the economic development work that 
remains in the ‘new’ economy does not lie with “bridging the digital divide,” so much as it does 
with training the ‘old’ labor force with the skills of the ‘new’ through public-private partnerships 
(e.g., Capital Region Partnership).
61 The entrepreneurial approach, in this view, would continue to 
facilitate information transfer by encouraging inter-agency partnerships; supporting industry-led 
technology councils and regional skills alliances; initiating public programs that work with 
business ‘clusters’; and, implementing a workforce development system, which is linked to the 
private sector. Again, this would emphasize that local and regional jurisdictions “shift” their 
focus from providing individual businesses with tax breaks and direct subsidies to facilitating 
workforce development through public-public and industry-led public-private partnership. This 
                                                       
61 Approximately 52 percent of the labor force (25 or older) in the Hartford-Springfield region has only a 
high school degree or less; 22.3 percent of which has less than 12 years of schooling (PVPC, 1999). 
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would also include “targeting” industries, creating a skilled workforce and fostering an innovative 
‘business climate.’ 
3. “Information District” Development 
The Telecommunications Reform Act set the stage for the deregulation of the telecom 
industry in 1996, which unleashed competition into the telecommunications market. 
Subsequently, new ‘high-tech’ companies have placed an increased demand for ‘unshackled’ 
sectors of the market (i.e., the “Dot-coms”). For the entrepreneurial planner, this eventually has 
manifested itself into the profitable real-estate opportunities of urban telecommunications-
oriented development. However, not every obsolete building has been a good candidate for 
conversion because many are office-building retrofits (i.e., Class B or C), while only some of 
these properties are new construction (i.e., Class A);
62 defunct shopping centers are also among 
these classifications. Nevertheless, the old vacant industrial building appears to have had it’s 
calling for the re-incorporation of its previous manufacturing utility as a newly rehabbed 
‘telecom’-related facility. The marketability of these properties and other vacant industrial and 
commercial land typically highlights its proximity to railroad rights-of-way and the fiber optic 
cables that are commonly sited there. The location of these properties in older inner city 
neighborhoods also allow their promoters to market the easy access to Downtown services and 
transportation interchanges. Regardless of these advantages, industrial and commercial land in the 
                                                       
62 Building classifications (Colebrook Realty Services, Inc.): Class A: Office buildings constructed after 
1965 and whose quality has been maintained by professional management. Class B: Rehabilitated office 
buildings constructed earlier than 1965 and whose quality has been maintained by professional 
management or, structures built after 1965 and maintained by moderate quality management; Class C: 
Office buildings constructed earlier than 1965 and maintained by moderate quality management. Available 
floor space in the Pioneer Valley is in upwards of 2.5 million square feet, the majority of which is split 
between Class B and C space; approximately ten percent is Class A. (C.B. Richard Ellis, Western MA 
Economic Development Council (EDC) and the Holyoke Economic Development and Industrial 
Corporation (HEDIC)) (Table 3-3, 3-4, 3-5). 
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inner city has a number of planning constraints, which includes land that is often contaminated, 
too small, or located in an unreputable area of the city (e.g., perceived crime). 
 
There is currently no comprehensive data compiled on commercial and industrial 
capacity for Springfield and the Pioneer Valley; a strong measure of which would be the amount 
of available industrial and commercial land and floor space. However, the Pioneer Valley 
Planning Commission’s Industrial and Commercial Sites Database has taken the first steps 
toward compiling the necessary data. The list of properties downloaded on July 30 of last year 
included 80 entries of vacant land and floor space for sale or lease in the Pioneer Valley. All 
vacant land averaged approximately 23 acres with 50 percent of the properties averaging only 6 
acres. 
a. Areas of core technology strength 
Industrial, business and technology parks have competitive advantages that older inner 
cities will find difficult to create.
63 Griffin Center is an ambitious example of this industrial park 
advantage over the inner city. It occupies 600 acres between Windsor and Bloomfield (CT.) and 
lies 6 miles north of Hartford between Downtown and Bradley International Airport, and a short 
drive south on Interstate 91 (30 min.) from Springfield (Fig.3.4). The area has been steadily 
converted from tobacco fields in the mid-1980s into nearly 2 million square feet of office space, 
including a 165,000 s.f. building for JDS Uniphase.
64 According to Griffin officials, the office 
                                                       
63 Technology and business parks are defined as follows (Blakely, Edward J., 1994): Technology park – A 
collection of advanced technology industries concerned with both research and manufacturing, located in 
attractive, well-landscaped surroundings and situated within a reasonable catchment area of a scientific 
university or major institute. Business park – A prestigious environment, suitable for a wide range of 
activities, including manufacturing, assembly, sales and other office-based activities. There is no 
requirement for these parks to be close to academic institutions. 
64 JDS Uniphase designs and manufactures fiber-optic telecommunications components. 
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park will likely grow to 2.5 million square feet over the next three to four years and to 3 million 
(s.f.) in the years afterward. 
 
This park far exceeds its average counterpart, because it is able to offer an urban 
microcosm of “downtown” amenities.
65 The Griffin Center is a master planned business 
community, which has been developed by Griffin Land and Nurseries, a landscape nursery and 
real estate development business (Griffin Land). Together with the town of Windsor (27,000), 
Griffin Land is also developing a proposal for a 6,500-seat amphitheater for the Hartford 
Symphony Orchestra that will utilize the park’s vast parking lots. Jogging trails integrated with a 
nine-hole putting green, volleyball, and a 225-person restaurant are available to all of the 3000 
individuals employed at the park. Additional restaurants and carryout food services, day-care and 
retail shopping is in the planning stages. Included in the planning stages is an existing on-site 
railroad spur (Griffin Line) that could be extended to Bradley International Airport, providing 
area mass transit from Hartford. 
 
There are currently seven technology parks/centers in the Hartford-Springfield metro 
area, five in Connecticut and two in Massachusetts (Table 3.6). They are 229 Technology Park 
and ESPN (Broadcasting Center) (Bristol), South Windsor Technology Center (S. Windsor), 
Windham Mills Technology Park (Windham), Day Hill Technology Park (Windsor), Palmer 
Technology Park (Palmer, MA), and STCC – Technology Park (Springfield). All sites are 
strategically located along major interstate highways (I-84, I-90, and I-91), with the exception of 
Windham Mills Tech Park. STCC – Technology Park is the only one located in the inner city, 
while the rest are sited in suburban locations. This inventory of ‘high-tech’ parks together with 
                                                       
65 Aside from a pleasant work environment, the Center offers recreation and entertainment, and hassle-free 
parking. 
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that of business and industrial parks is clearly not a measure of economic activity, nor does it 
intend to measure the capacity for commercial and industrial development. It does attempt, 
however, to quantify the industrial district development in the Hartford-Springfield metro areas. 
 
b. Industrial and commercial capacity 
The following section combines the findings of an industrial, business and technology 
parks survey of Hartford and Springfield metro areas. It incorporates the data from a commercial 
and industrial capacity study of the Pioneer Valley Region by the Pioneer Valley Planning 
Commission (PVPC, 1999) (Tables 3.7, 3.8). The number of municipalities from the PVPC study, 
however, was reduced in order to correspond with only those municipalities in the Hartford and 
Springfield Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). PVPC’s study calculates a measure of capacity 
relative to the size of a community’s labor force in order to determine each municipality’s ability 
to provide the personnel needed for commercial and industrial activity. The study recognizes two 
principle issues with its data: parcel “size” and “property value.” In an effort to mitigate the lack 
of “size” data, it introduced property values by assuming that the size of the land is a substantial 
element in its value. However, “property values” are contingent on a number of other factors,
66 
namely location. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, PVPC presents the data as an “available 
alternative” to no data. 
 
Two issues with the study remain, which PVPC failed to recognize. The following 
aspects are representative of the complexity behind the measurement of a municipality’s ability to 
                                                       
66 Recall David Adams (1994). Implications to property value also include adjacent properties, public 
utilities (including telecommunications), accessibility to transportation infrastructure, size and 
configuration of the site, and necessary site work and contamination cleanup. All of these factors remain 
underscored by their proximity to service centers such as a downtown or industrial ‘cluster.’ The safety and 
general quality of the surrounding area (e.g., available quality housing) will always be a factor regardless of 
these other site characteristics. 
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compete competitively with other jurisdictions for economic development; the second of the two 
has been central to this thesis. First, an available labor force also has its factors, namely 
educational attainment and intermunicipal mobility. For this reason, the ratio calculated to 
measure “capacity” is misleading. Second, the calculated commercial and industrial “capacity” 
does not consider the presence or lack of ‘strategic management’ factors behind the policies, 
programs and projects that initiate, facilitate, and implement economic development (e.g., 
“industry targeting” and effective public-private partnerships). This is a consideration in 
counterpoint to cities and regions supplying individual companies with tax breaks and other 
subsidies irrespective of whether they have a ‘competitive advantage’ in the “targeted” industry 
sector. In other words, local urban planning approaches should identify and cater financial 
packages to those companies within the “targeted” industry sectors (Table 3.9). As described 
earlier, there is a fine line between inter-municipal competitiveness and the actions behind 
“entrepreneurship” as the consensus or “organizing capacity” necessary for negotiating public-
private partnership. 
 
Regardless, the PVPC study offers some interesting observations. Commercial properties 
in the Massachusetts portion of the Hartford-Springfield MSA decreased by 375 parcels
67 (3.9%) 
in 1998 from 9,311 in (FY) 1993, while industrial property decreased by eight parcels (0.3%) 
from 3,025. The greatest percentage gains in commercial parcels per municipality were among 
some of the smallest towns in the region, while the urban core (Springfield, Chicopee and 
Holyoke) experienced a decline. In fact, Springfield experienced the mildest decline (0.3%), 
while Hatfield and Hadley represented more than double the “relative capacity”
68 of any other 
                                                       
67 A parcel is a taxable unit of land irrespective of its size or use. Religious centers and government-related 
uses (e.g., city hall) are exempt from this taxation. A particular development might consist of a number of 
parcels with different owners (public and private) or single ownership. 
68 Relative capacity is the number of parcels divided by labor force in the 1,000s. 
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municipality and five times the relative capacity of the overall region.
69 Both towns represent a 
commercial capacity ratio of 168.0 and 159.0 respectively. Interestingly, however, Hadley’s 
community character (“Kind of Community”) has been designated by the U.S. Census (2000) as 
“resort, retirement, artistic.” This would not be an indicator of a commercial and industrial 
community; the high capacity ratio is actually a result of the high traffic corridors of RT. 9 
(between Amherst and Northampton) and I-91 that run through the city. 
 
The greatest increases in industrial parcels included Easthampton, gaining 35 parcels 
(50%) in (FY) 1998 from 70 in 1993, and Hatfield with a gain of 11 parcels (100%) from 11. The 
next greatest gain was Chicopee with nine parcels (2.6%) from 346, and Springfield with a gain 
of 15 parcels (3.1%) from 491 in 1993 and an industrial capacity of 7.3. The average industrial 
capacity ratio for the Springfield Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) was 9.6 and 10.4 for the 
Pioneer Valley Region. The greatest industrial capacity, though, was in the hill towns of 
Plainfield (66.3) and the “rural economic center” (U.S Census, 2000) of Russell, with nearly five-
times the metro average (45.4). One would assume that there would be a ‘cluster’ of industrial 
activity within Russel,
70 but it does not have one. Again, this reinforces the suburban expansion of 
industrial development. Irrespective of the negative environmental impacts of this suburban 
telecommunications-oriented sprawl, the growth of industrial and commercial capacity in those 
areas has encouraged realtors to confirm the region’s position as a potential “[tele] 
communications nexus and fertile ground for Internet developers.” This has been observed by 
Colebrook Realty Services, Inc. who point to the ‘wiring’ of new and existing office space that 
                                                       
69 Hatfield (0.3%) experienced a small decline by one parcel from 380 in (FY) 1993, while Hadley (2.1%) 
increased by six parcels from 289 in the same year. 
70 Russel is already included in the SMSA and continues to grow (4% between 1990-2000). 
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3.1: New Atlantic Triangle 
Source: American Fact Finder/ CT21 (1999)/ Graphic rendering by author 
 
3.2: Springfield and Hartford Metro Areas 

















*Respective counties correspond (Hartford/Tolland (CT); Hampden/Hampshire/Franklin (MA)) 
with the shaded areas. 
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Figure 




        Knowledge Corridor 
        Metro Area 
Source: American Fact Finder/Author Survey 
 
3.4: Distribution of Technology Parks/Centers for Springfield and Hartford Metro Areas  
Source: American Fact Finder/Author Survey 
Windham Mills
Tech Park















3.1: Boston Hartford New York Metro Market 
Boston 321,704,554
Hartford 102,128,519
New York Metro 1,006,335,493
Manhattan NA




INDUSTRIAL MARKET TOTAL NRA*
Source: Connecticut Regional Institute for the 21
st Century (CT21), (1999). “Connecticut: A 
Strategic Economic Framework.” 
* Net Rentable Area 
 
3.2: Selected Metro Rankings (Out of 56) 
Raleigh-Durham 2 11 1 7 1
Des Moines 10 1 4 45 5
Charlotte 6 34 9 13 9
Columbia 25 20 3 16 11
Hartford-Springfield 17 23 12 18 12
Cincinnati 22 38 25 3 18
Hartford 12 19 40 9 22
Albany 51 12 22 26 31
Providence 24 29 35 38 34
Springfield 54 44 47 41 49















3.3: Greater Springfield Office Market Vacancy 
GREATER SPRINGFIELD OFFICE MARKET VACANCY
Holyoke, Chicopee, Ludlow, Longmeadow, East Longmeadow, Wilbraham, West Springfield, Agawam
Class A: 1.6 Million s.f. Vacancy








Class B: 1.8 Million s.f.
Springfield Central Business District (CBD)
13.9% (down from 16.9% in 1999 and 
19.26% in 1998 )
Suburbs >10%
Holyoke 12%
Class C: 2.1 Million s.f.
Springfield Central Business District (CBD)
49% (8% deterioration rate, 41,600 s.f., up 
from 38.86 % in 1998)
Regionally 44%
Source: Pyres, Robert and Jeff Hayden, 2001. "Overview of Area Real Estate Market" (based on 
last years annual Office Space Survey of Greater Springfield, prepared by Colebrook Realty 
Services, Inc., and published in Business Magazine (Dill, 2001)) 
 
3.4: Hampden County Industrial Market 
Agawam 1.4 Million s.f.
Ludlow 1.6 Million s.f.
Westfield 3.1 Million s.f.
West Springfield 3.2 Million s.f.
East Longmeadow 3.8 Million s.f.
Holyoke 5.3 Million s.f.
Chicopee 7 Million s.f.
Palmer 1.1 Million s.f.
Springfield 9.7 Million s.f.
Monson .16 Million s.f.
Wilbraham .32 Million s.f.
Total 36.68 Million s.f.
HAMPDEN COUNTY INDUSTRIAL MARKET
Source: C.B. Richard Ellis 1999-2000 
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Table 
3.5: Significant Development Parcels 
Agawam Tennis Club Property Rt. 57 90+/ Acres
Amherst Rt. 116 North Amherst 110 +/ Acres
East Longmeadow Benton Dr. & Deer Park 104 +/ Acres
Holyoke Crossroads Industrial Park (Bobala Rd.) 80 +/ Acres
Northampton Rt. 10 Business Park 117+/ Acres
Northampton Business Park - Northampton State Hospital 144 +/ Acres
Palmer Palmer Airport 350+/ Acres
Springfield Cottage St. (landfill) 52+/ Acres
Springfield Springfield Plaza Site 37+/ Acres
Springfield Smith & Wesson 62 +/ Acres
Westfield Owens District Rd. 207 +/ Acres
Westfield Cabot St. 67 +/ Acres
Westfield Falcon Drive 67 +/ Acres
Westfield DEC Property 75 +/ Acres
West Springfield K&M Site 80 +/ Acres
Montague WMECO 100 +/ Acres
Total 1742 +/ Acres
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT PARCELS
Source: Western MA Economic Development Council 2000 
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Table 
3.6: Industrial, Business and Technology Parks Survey 
Continued next page 
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Table 
3.6 (Continued) 
Continued next page 
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3.6 (Continued) 
Continued next page 
    6 1     
Table 
3.6 (Continued) 
Continued next page 
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3.6 (Continued) 
Source: Author Survey 
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Table 
3.7: Industrial and Commercial Parcels/Relative Capacity 
Continued on next page 
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Table 
3.7 (Continued) 
Source: Pioneer Valley Planning Commission  
    6 5     
Table 
3.8: Industrial, Business and Technology Parks/Relative Capacity 
Continued on next page 
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3.8 (Continued) 
Source: Pioneer Valley Planning Commission 
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Table 
3.9: Areas of Core Technology Strength 
Targeted Industry Description companies employees
Advanced materials
Primary sectors include paper converting, 
plastic sheets, injection molding, and 
thermal molding companies. The 
technology focus would include coatings, 




Primary sectors include traditional 
information services in data processing, 
network services, computer programming, 
software development, systems integration 
and outsourcing. This would also include 






Primary sectors include electronic 
components design, engineering, 
assembling and packaging. Technology 
focus would encompass microwave and 
millimeter wave technologies, RF 






Primary sectors include primary industries 
in metal fabrication, industrial machinery 
and devices, and aerospace. Technology 
focus would include advanced techniques 
ranging from precision manufacturing to 




Primary sectors include drug development, 
diagnostic equipment, medical instruments 
and devices, and research and testing. Food 
sciences, agricultural chemicals (including 
seeds and fertilizer) and environmental 
biotechnology would also be included
FIVE AREAS OF CORE TECHNOLOGY STRENGTH 
companies and employees not 
compiled.
Source: Regional Technology Alliance, 2001 
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CHAPTER IV 
A “LOCAL AUTONOMY PERSPECTIVE” 
The Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ packages vacant low-cost office 
space with business support. The program will market the vacant retail and office space of a 
designated area or “information district” as Internet-ready or ‘plug and go’ space.  This ‘district’ 
has been conceived as an area of desired urban regeneration. It will potentially coincide with and 
or respond to any real estate demands from the businesses trained at the STCC – Technology 
Park. The Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ is also designed to work in 
cooperation with other regional efforts in an attempt to support the regional development of a 
strong technology sector for Western Massachusetts. ‘New England’s Knowledge Corridor’ has 
been conceived as the vehicle for this effort. Locally, it is imperative, however, that the program 
avoids simply becoming a real-estate development endeavor. That is, the shortfall of a place-
based approach, risks operating on a micro-scale at the cost of an integrated multi-sectored plan 
that would consider issues such as housing, transportation and workforce training. Therefore, 
limiting an entrepreneurial partnership approach to a small district area leaves the strategic 
element of an integrated city plan absent. The following chapter briefly offers a profile of 
Springfield’s local economy and the marketability of vacant land and lease space, while assessing 
whether an “information district” could be sustained in the future. It will also attempt to identify 
the unique local players, private and public partnerships, and university cooperation behind the 
Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program.’ 
A. Nature of the Local Economy 
The success behind local and regional ‘high-tech’ expansion, economic development and 
urban telecommunications-oriented revitalization, is largely contingent on whether urban planners 
are able to assemble a ‘critical mass’ of socioeconomic factors; only then will a desired number 
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of economic benefits be attained. With respect to urban telecommunications-oriented 
development strategies for economic revitalization policies should have a strong sense of the 
“Information” industry sector in the local economic base and the necessary labor force to sustain 
it. This will not only help to isolate ‘competitive advantages’ and workforce competencies, but it 
should also illustrate the concentrations of existing economic activity. Keeping track of these 
developments, while “targeting” emerging industry sectors may help find innovative policies that 
integrate the traditional economic base with ‘new’ labor markets. 
1. Educational Attainment 
High School educational attainment in Springfield (69.6%), together with other 
traditional industrial cities and towns like Chicopee, Holyoke and Ludlow (avg. 68%), is 
relatively lower than the average attainment in Hampden County (79.6%) and the State (80%). 
There is a 15 percent secondary educational attainment level in Springfield. This is lower than 
attainment levels in Hampden County (17.6%) and the State (27.2%), with the exception of 
Holyoke (15.2%), Chicopee (10.4%) and Ludlow (11.9%). Substantial help from the University 
of Massachusetts and the ‘Five College Area’
71 provide a different picture of secondary 
educational attainment in Hampshire County (31.9%); high school educational attainment levels 
are much higher as well (83.0%). Nationally, these attainment levels are 25.1 percent in high 
school education and 81.6 percent in secondary educational attainment (U.S. Census 2000, 
Population and Housing Survey). 
2. ‘High-Tech’ Presence in the Local Economic Base 
According to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) designations, 
the ‘high-tech’ sector has been defined as “Information.” There are 203 and 477 “Information” 
                                                       
71 The ‘Five College Area’ consists of the University of Massachusetts and, Amherst, Holyoke, Smith and 
Hampshire colleges. 
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sector establishments in Springfield and Hartford respectively. This accounts for only 2 percent of 
the total labor force in the Springfield and 3 percent in the Hartford metro areas (MSA Business 
Patterns, 1999), which corresponds with 2.69 percent for the Hartford and Springfield metro areas 
combined.
72’ The “Information” sector (51*) includes publishing industries, motion picture and 
sound recording industries, broadcasting and telecommunications, and information and data 
processing services. Although, one also could include the supporting “Information” industry 
sectors of “finance & insurance” (52*), “professional, scientific & technical services” (54*)” and 
“management of companies and enterprises” (55*) to an “information district.” In doing so, labor 
force levels increase to 12% and 23% in Springfield and Hartford respectively. Relative to the 
manufacturing sector, the “Information” sector is still a substantially small portion of the total 
labor force in each of these metro areas. The top four industry divisions for each of the 
Springfield and Hartford metro areas are manufacturing, health care and social assistance, finance 
and insurance, and retail trade. All four divisions account for more than 50 percent of the total 
labor force (Fig. 4.1). 
B. Marketability 
Because cities operate in a highly competitive market, they can just as often drive 
developers to other jurisdictions as they can attract them. Economic development generally has 
less to do with how one adapts to market demand and more to do with how one builds markets. 
Springfield’s current telecommunications advantage, as far as security and redundancy is 
concerned, is centered on the distribution of its long-distance carrier services in Downtown. In the 
absence of a citywide network, there is also no significant concentration of ‘telecom’-related 
companies, or ‘high-tech’ R&D activity in the city with the exception of STCC- Technology 
                                                       
72 The Hartford and Springfield metro areas do not constitute the four-county (Hartford/Tolland and 
Hampden/Hampshire) designation of ‘New England’s Knowledge Corridor.’ See Fig. 3.2-3.3. 
71  
Park. Therefore, it would be fair to conclude that ‘high-tech’ activity exists in Springfield, but it 
is sparse. 
1. Vacant Downtown Office Space in Springfield 
Springfield posted a historically low vacancy level for Class A space at 5.0 percent and 
overall vacancy levels at 17.12 percent in 1998 (Colebrook, 1999). More recently, these figures 
have slightly increased to 5.83 percent for Class A space, while overall vacancy levels have 
actually dropped to 12.15 percent. The majority of Class B space is located in the Springfield 
Central Business District (Fig. 4.2, 4.3). These vacancy levels were significantly higher at 13.9 
percent with the absorption of 46,000 s.f. of previously vacant space (16.9%). Class C vacancy 
levels were the highest at 44 percent. The numbers across the entire market, however, only 
revealed a modest 10,000 s.f. of absorption. The discrepancy has resulted from approximately 
134,000 s.f. of undeclared vacant sublease space, equating to one vacant Class A office building 
in Downtown and an actual vacancy level of 17.21 percent (Dill, 2001).
73 
 
The Springfield brokerage firm of Colebrook Realty Services, Inc. found that recent 
advances in technology and ‘high-tech’ start-ups would fill the void of larger institutional 
consolidations, namely sublease space. It forecasted, like many other market analysts at the time, 
that this demand for ‘telecom’ space would play a pivotal role in Springfield’s future as a 
telecommunications hub (Colebrook, 1999). Colebrook’s observation unfortunately, however, 
preceded the telecommunications market downturn in 1999-2000, but the “Information” sector 
should continue to generate corporate consolidation and restructuring. This could also be 
accompanied by a long-term demand for faster and cheaper telecommunications systems and the 
                                                       
73 The sublease space discrepancy is due to the tenants who are unable to fully occupy the space they 
committed themselves to in their lease agreements, while building owners continue to claim that it is 
leased. Regardless, these vacancy figures are the lowest noted since the 1980s. 
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growth and development of small to medium size firms in Springfield. In fact, it has been these 
small to medium-size firms, like Court Square Data Group and Disability Management Services, 
that have absorbed much of the inventory reintroduced back into the market by downsized 
corporations in sublease space (Dill, 2001) (Tables 4.1, 4.2). 
2. Vacant Industrial and Commercial Land and Buildings in Springfield 
In the industrial and commercial capacity assessment of the Pioneer Valley, Springfield 
experienced a mild decline (0.3%) in the number of commercial and industrial land parcels, while 
the region’s small towns experienced an increase (PVPC, 1999). This mild decline as opposed to 
the increased rate of acquired industrial and commercial land in the suburbs has signaled the 
unmet industry market demand that Springfield must harness through land promotion and 
“industry-targeting.” In light of this need for inner city industrial land development, Springfield 
has consequently begun to identify vacant industrial and commercial properties. The process has 
resulted in an on-going survey by the Springfield Office of Economic Development and the 
Springfield Business Development Corporation. Early findings have determined that many 
properties are small at under an acre. Additionally, the amount of contaminated soil in these and 
other industrial parcels is generally unconfirmed. Regardless of these disadvantages, the non-
contaminated site of the Chicopee River Business Park remains undeveloped despite its easy 
access to regional highway interchanges, on-site utilities and road infrastructure, and a close 
proximity to the STCC – Technology Park and Downtown Springfield. Again, this reinforces the 
need for “targeting” local and regional unmet market demand in addition to identifying potential 
land development (Tables 4.3, 4.4). 
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C. Probability that industry can be sustained 
Local business assistance in Springfield is not sufficiently provided through private 
venture capital. Mass Venture Corporation, Inc.,
74 for instance, currently offers limited financial 
services to ‘high-tech’ business start-ups, but it can only finance small endeavors. This is a 
drawback to urban telecommunications-oriented development, desiring to attract a ‘high-tech’ 
‘cluster’ of firms to a given area (CED, 1998, p. 17). Most businesses in Western Massachusetts 
are small. The 68 plastics industry firms in this part of the State, for example, employed fewer 
than 100 people in 1990. Industrial machinery and fabricated metals companies average between 
35-40 employees. Therefore, the small business profile of most industrial activity has left large 
banks unwilling to risk lending to new business start-ups (EOEA, 1993). Furthermore, the lack of 
presence by a major R&D institution (e.g., UMass Polymer Sciences and Engineering Program
75) 
and a business venture capital organization (e.g., Mass Ventures) does not help. Both are key 
social and institutional resources for urban telecommunications-oriented development and its 
ability to competitively accommodate small to medium size ‘high-tech’ business activity. 
 
Western Massachusetts Enterprise Fund, Inc. is among the few organizations currently 
lending to small and medium-size businesses at the STCC – Technology Park. There remains, 
                                                       
74 Mass Venture Corporation, Inc. (Mass Ventures) is a partnership of university, business and State 
government representation in Hadley (MA). Its consultation services are aimed at high-growth companies 
in critical stages of development. Mass Ventures has invested $6.8 million of the Mass Ventures Equity 
Fund, which, in turn, syndicated another $63 million in outside capital (i.e., subsequent investment and 
acquisition capital). There are four venture funds in the Pioneer Valley; two are specific to Western 
Massachusetts—Mass Ventures Equity Fund and Long River Ventures. 
75New Bedford´s $90 million dollar (waterfront) acquarium complex will house the new Science Education 
and Economic Development (SEED) Center among other functions. SEED is the research arm of the 
Center for Marine Science Technology, aiming to extend its services and expertise by establishing New 
Bedford as the “Atlantic Rim” center for marine science and education. The Center will include operational 
and research facilities, offices, classrooms, conference areas, and a business incubator for marine-oriented 
start-ups; development of emerging technologies; and, technical assistance. 2.6% of New Bedford’s 
workforce is in the “Information” industry sector (Springfield 2%). Last year, Massachusetts “Information” 
sector employment held at 5.6% (iMarket, 2000; UMass, Donahue Institute, 2000). 
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however, the need for access to new capital in the Pioneer Valley. Diversifying the region’s 
industrial-base away from defense-related customers will be an important first step, since 
CBOs/CDCs and other “third-force organizations,” alone, are unable to compensate for the lack 
of State and Federal defense contracts and local venture capital. Local governments will also have 
to contribute significantly in this area by streamlining and improving accessibility to the 
regulatory process (e.g., “one-stop shopping” permitting). The Springfield Regional Economic 
Development Center in Downtown has begun to do so by concentrating a number of economic 
development services in one location. Telitcom, the Springfield Business Development 
Corporation and a number of other affiliates of the Western Massachusetts Economic 
Development Council (EDC) are among those represented by the Center. 
1. The Info Tech Village (Buffalo, NY): An Eight-Point Plan 
Below is an “eight-point plan” behind the financing of an urban telecommunications-
oriented development strategy. Buffalo’s Info Tech Village
76 and Byte Belt “eight-point plan” is a 
Mayor-initiated economic development strategy, which recognizes that the city’s economic 
potential is predicated on its ability to exploit emerging telecommunications technology as a 
catalyst for urban-economic revitalization. The Info Tech Village has been designed in close 
proximity to Buffalo’s Theater District. The Byte Belt area, which is applicable to the “eight-point 
plan,” has been placed within the Village “information district” along the fiber-optic spine of 
Main Street. A critical element of this strategic initiative is the local participation of venture 
capital firms, individual Downtown property owners, real estate brokers, IT businesses and 
community leaders together with the Buffalo Economic Development Corporation (BERC). The 
                                                       
76 The Lynn Cyber District Council (LCDC) offers another example of an urban telecommunication-
oriented development. It is responsible for developing Downtown Lynn as an “information district,” 
reversing the area’s blight with highly skilled and well-paid professionals; small Internet-related businesses 
have already located themselves within the district. 
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council will oversee the design and implementation of the Byte Belt in accordance with the 
following: 
1.  Targeted lending, venture capital, grant and real estate assistance 
•  Special venture capital program  
Works with venture capital firms and identifies investment opportunities 
•  Special lending 
Identifies existing investment areas such as Economic Opportunity Areas (EOA) and re-
orients financial assistance to “targeted” industry sectors where possible. 
•  “Smartstructure” and “Smart” workforce development grants 
“Smartstructure” grants assist fledgling IT businesses by reducing the cost impacts of 
“wiring.” “Smart” workforce grants provide industry specific training; they should be 
encouraged as industry-led initiatives when possible.
77 Buffalo has considered both of 
these grants in their Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) budget.  
•  Real estate assistance 
Identifies individual properties and assists those property owners that desire to retrofit 
their building with current up to data telecommunication infrastructure (e.g., T1, T3 and 
“category 5” networking). 
2.  Formation of a Mayor’s information technology council 
3.  Designation of Downtown “Smart Building and Plug ‘n Go space 
•  “Smart Building” certification incentives 
Encourages the rehabilitation of buildings that are responsive to ‘high-tech’ demand 
4.  Regulatory Assistance 
•  Improved permitting processes 
                                                       
77 See Machine Action Program (MAP) (Forrant, 1997; Best and Forrant, 2000). 
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Encourages a movement toward on-line permitting 
5.  Public Relations Assistance 
•  Website, new postings, conferences 
Promotes individual newsworthy business success stories and disseminates the 
information through local and national outlets 
6.  Development of an IT Charter School 
7.  Development of an IT Training Initiative 
•  IT specific training programs and research related initiatives 
Works with local training providers and institutions of higher learning 
8.  Managerial Assistance 
D. Behind the ‘Springfield Plugged-In City Technology Program’ 
Introducing the necessary fiber optic infrastructure into the City of Springfield is only the 
beginning. Bringing together “targeted” industry groups, higher education, and public and private 
non-profit sectors behind the ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ will be the next greatest 
challenge for the city, particularly with regard to packaging development grants, subsidies and 
private investment. EntreNetwork, an independent business development agency, has already 
begun to link entrepreneurs with financial and research-related resources. Included among its 
founding partners are Babson and Hampshire Colleges, Mass Ventures, Massachusetts Small 
Business Development Council (MSBDC), EDC, University of Massachusetts and STCC, and 
Davis and Ginspoon Foundations. Nevertheless, political and economic forces and rationales 
behind an urban telecommunications-oriented development strategy must first provide the means 
to a skilled workforce. This reiterates much of the emphasis that has been placed on “targeted” 




This thesis could not possibly discuss some individual actors behind the Springfield 
‘Plugged-In City Technology Program’ without risking the misrepresentation of others. Although, 
one could begin to organize them into the following two groups: regional alliances and research 
institutions, and local government and membership organizations. With the assumption that there 
is some overlap, these two groups generally provide private and public services in workforce 
development, strengthening of the local and regional ‘business climate,’
 78 and improving the 
general ‘quality of life’ in the city and the region.
79 Altogether, these actions constitute the 
removal of barriers to enterprise; expansion and employment; fostering competition between 
existing businesses; supporting product development or technological innovation; establishing 
local development corporations; supporting and encouraging the development of new companies; 
and, the procurement of local economic development programs. 
1. Regional Alliances/Research Institutions 
Springfield already provides or has benefited from a number of services rendered by 
various action groups. Regional alliances and research institutions such as the Regional 
Technology Alliance (RTA)
80 and the Technology Enterprise Council (TEC), for example, 
constitute the better part of these action groups. Both organizations have paralleled the efforts 
behind regional and State-initiated economic development strategies in the Pioneer Valley Plan 
                                                       
78 A strong ‘business climate’ is contingent on the presence of banks, private companies, and local, regional 
and State agencies and business incubators. Economic development actions for an improved ‘business 
climate’ include the removal of barriers to enterprise, expansion and employment, fostering competition 
between existing businesses, supporting product development or technological innovation, establishing 
local development corporations, and supporting and encouraging the development of new companies (e.g., 
STCC) (Usdin, 1997). 
79 In a location research study by AT Kearney, a global management-consulting firm, five key factors 
emerged. They included talent, universities, local government involvement, pillar companies, access to 
capital and specialized business services. A national sample of fifty senior executives from June 19 to July 
13, 2001, rated “talent” as the most critical location factor (86% agreed). In descending order, universities, 
local government involvement, pillar companies and access to capital received a +/- 30% favor rating; 
specialized business services placed last with 16%. 
80 Pioneer Valley Plan for Progress adopted the RTA in 2000. 
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for Progress and Choosing to Compete. The Economic Development Council of Western 
Massachusetts (EDC) and its affiliate organizations, namely the Springfield Business 
Development Corporation (SBDC) and Telitcom, are also among this group. Finally, educational 
and research institutions are many, though, only University of Massachusetts Amherst and the 
Springfield Technical Community College (STCC) actually have the sufficient resources to 
ground an urban telecommunication-oriented development strategy in Springfield. 
 
On the one hand, the University of Massachusetts Amherst (UMass), together with the 
Massachusetts Office of Economic Development (OED),
81 is a great resource of technology and 
information transfer. University of Massachusetts faculty and staff have been involved in a 
number of outreach programs in Springfield.
82 For example, the new ‘telecom’-related companies 
that have emerged from the institution’s resourcefulness include Amerinex Applied Imaging 
(Amherst), Blackboard Technology Group (Amherst), Regional Economic Models (Amherst), 
National Evaluation Systems (Amherst) and Millitech (S. Deerfield). Unfortunately, however, the 
need for a strong physical UMass presence in Downtown Springfield remains. On the other hand, 
the research and business development at STCC - Technology Park offer technical as well as 
financial assistance through its Center for Business and Technology (CBT), the Springfield 
Enterprise Center (SEC) and the Student Incubator. 
2. Local Government/Membership Organizations 
One of the more entrepreneurial contributions that the City of Springfield has contributed 
to and undersigned is the Regional Economic Development Center. In addition to those tenants 
already mentioned are the Springfield Redevelopment Authority (SRA), the Springfield Area 
                                                       
81 OED is the platform for the University Partners Program and Research Alliances. 
82 See “IMPACT, Increasing the Commonwealth: The Economic Impact of UMass Amherst,” University of 
Massachusetts Amherst, Office of Economic Development. 
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Council for Excellence (SPACE) and the Greater Springfield Chamber of Commerce. Currently, 
SRA sufficiently employs one individual. A lawyer. This is a drastic reduction from Springfield’s 
“urban renewal” days, however, SRA could become a critical player in Springfield’s future urban 
telecommunications-oriented development needs by exercising the powers of eminent domain as 
well as those of purchasing and the acquisition of land. 
 
The membership organizations of SPACE and the “chambers” are the local 
“cheerleaders.” They hold an important place in marketing and promoting the city and the 
regional image, but due to the nature of their operations as member-oriented services, their public 
contributions are limited. The Springfield Business Development Corporation and Telitcom are 
also in a position to rally the necessary action groups around a telecommunications-oriented 
development, provided there is a mutually proactive pursuit of partnership by the Springfield 
Media and Technology Group, Inc. (SMTG) and the Springfield Technology Initiative (STI) with 
the EDC. Finally, the local government will be required to continue streamlining economic 
activity as proactive promoters of land development and as entrepreneurial planners. This will 
regularly include reviewing existing zoning ordinances in order to avoid conflict between 
economic development initiatives and zoning requirements, creating a capital improvement 
program and analyzing existing permitting processes. 
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Source: U.S. Census, 1999 Metropolitan Statistical Areas Business Patterns 
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Figure 
4.2: Springfield Downtown and Central Business District 
 
STCC – Technology Park 
Source: Springfield Planning Department 
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Figure 
4.3: City of Springfield Business, Industrial and Commercial Use Distribution 
 
Source: Springfield Planning Department 
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Tel, ISDN Lines, 
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Fiber Optic
AN O 9 5 0 9 5 0
1675 Main 1675 Main Tel C YES 2912
1675 Main 1675 Main Tel C YES 1512
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Tel, ISDN Lines, 
DSL, T1,Fiber 
Optic
B NO 5800 5800
Total Available Retail Space in the BID: 69328 58560
* telecommunications infrastructure is integrated with category 5 network
*** the overall space at Tower Square is +/- 10,000 sqft in the tower and +/- 70,000 sqft.
     in the mezzanine
Source: Springfield Business Improvement District 
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Table 
4.2: City of Springfield, Downtown Vacant Office Space 
55 State Street 55 State Street Tel, DSL  B NO 1500
55 State Street 55 State Street Tel, DSL  B YES 1550
55 State Street 55 State Street Tel, DSL  B NO 600
55 State Street 55 State Street Tel, DSL  B NO 1200
Peerless Building 1331 Main Street Tel, T1 B NO 3400 3400
Brigham 
Building
1365 Main Street Tel, T1 B YES 3036 3036
Brigham 
Building
1365 Main Street Tel, T1 B YES 800 800
Brigham 
Building
1365 Main Street Tel, T1 B NO 507 507
Brigham 
Building
1365 Main Street Tel, T1 B YES 350 350
95 State Street 95 State Street*
Tel, ISDN Lines, 
T1,
B NO 6417 6417
 Fiber Optic
95 State Street 95 State Street*
Tel, ISDN Lines, 
T1,
B NO 1687 1687
 Fiber Optic
95 State Street 95 State Street*
Tel, ISDN Lines, 
T1,
B NO 1687 1687
 Fiber Optic
101 State Street 101 State Street*
Tel, ISDN Lines, 
T1,
B NO 4283 4283
 Fiber Optic
75 Market Place 1383 Main Street
Tel, LAN, Fiber 
Optic
B NO 2300 2300
Bookstore Bldg 1383 Main Street
Tel, LAN, Fiber 
Optic
B YES 20000 20000
Sovereign Bank/ 1350 Main Street
Tel, ISDN Lines, 
DSL, 
A YES 50000 50000
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73 State Street 73 State Street Tel, B NO 1500
Paramount 1694 Main Street Tel, DSL B YES 22000
Harrison Place 1391 Main Street Tel, ISDN Lines B YES 8000
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1341 Main Street Tel A YES 4775
1341 Main 
Street
1341 Main Street Tel A YES 4775
Fuller Block 1531 Main Street Tel B YES 10000
The Main Office 
@First Mass
1441 Main Street
Tel, DSL, Fiber 
Optic
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Office Space in 
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* telecommunications infrastructure is integrated with category 5 network
** the telecommunications infrastructure listed is located outside of the building
Source: Springfield Business Improvement District
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4.3: City of Springfield, Vacant Industrial/Commercial Land Inventory 




Source: Springfield Office of Economic Development/ Author Survey 
92  
Table 
4.4: City of Springfield, Vacant Industrial/Commercial Buildings Inventory 








CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Planning must address the causal structures of the city condition, while continuing to 
direct its attention closer to the symptomatic indicators as well. The market-oriented promotion of 
a ‘high-tech’ image in U.S. mid-size cities and the transformation of a procedural to a more 
proactive form of urban redevelopment are among these discussed issues. The key policy issue 
has been an entrepreneurial shift from ‘welfare’ issues to economic regeneration. In other words, 
the traditional issues of ‘social equity’ are replaced by notions of competition whereby the 
rationale for the distribution of financial resources is based on the competitive strength of the 
players and the local economic development groups that have replaced traditional government 
structures. The key question behind the subsequent entrepreneurial planning practices has been 
whether to plan on the basis of what the private sector can be induced to deliver, or analyze local 
socioeconomic conditions and plan on the basis of addressing them instead. The proactive role of 
entrepreneurial governance in market-oriented promotional development campaigns, such as the 
“information district,” raises this very question. This thesis has, therefore, argued that an 
entrepreneurial-partnership approach to a small district area will leave the strategic element of an 
integrated city plan absent. This reiterates much of the emphasis that has been placed on industry-
led workforce training, which must coincide with “targeted” industries, including the attraction of 
a strong institutional presence in R&D and networking initiatives. Furthermore, market-oriented 
promotional development programs are set into a competitive free market environment. For this 
reason, neither the public nor the private sector alone will achieve economic development. In the 
absence of a “theory” for achieving a collaborative form of economic development, it is certain 
that successful entrepreneurial governance will be dictated by the degree of public-private 
partnership or “organizing capacity,” which should be strategically managed on a citywide scale. 
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Finally, urban planning, as a public action that produces a sustained and widespread 
private market reaction, rests on a comprehensive consideration of the non-quantifiable forces 
behind the acceleration and deceleration of economic development. A determinant, in this view, 
is the heightened interaction among economic and political jurisdictions. The uneven character of 
these interactions in terms of city and regional economic, technological, and political forces has 
challenged and will generally continue to challenge urban planning, and urban 
telecommunications-oriented development in particular. Other determinants include market 
unpredictability, the multiplication of promotional campaigns, and the horizontal public-public 
and public-private inter-dependent relationships of collaboration and partnership. 
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A. Recommendations 
The following recommendations should help to structure the future development of the 
Springfield ‘Plugged-In City Technology Program,’ as well as provide some insight into the 
elements of a sustainable telecommunications-oriented economic development strategy. 
 
•  Creative lending services behind urban telecommunications-oriented development should 
include real estate assistance, workforce grants and indirect incentives like “smart building” 
certifications and corresponding credits (e.g., R&D credits). This might also include a capital 
improvement program (CIP) that provides infrastructure development (e.g., fiber). In cases of 
commercially non-viable development, capital improvement should take place over several 
financial years, requiring extensive budgeting schedules, timely financial incentives, and the 
availability of and access to applications for the financing of complex projects years in 
advance. 
 
•  Special lending programs should continue to build and encourage past economic development 
initiatives, State-funded or otherwise (e.g., EOAs). Small and medium size companies that 
are drawn to “information districts” will be price sensitive. Rather than provide direct 
subsidies such as rent abatements, one should consider packaging creative lending services 
with designated areas of tax increment financing (TIF) and other programs; a city like 
Springfield already offers competitive rents. 
 
•  The “Information” sector is broad. Efforts behind urban telecommunications-oriented 
development strategies should consider “industry-targeting,” recognizing unmet local and 
regional demand. This should include individual businesses and their respective industry 
sectors; one should not recreate, instead one should build on what already exists. 
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•  Networking all related business development services (technical and management) in one 
central location and in close proximity to the business community will help to establish a 
strong ‘business climate.’ 
 
•  Mixed-use “information districts” will be able to provide a more diverse number of related 
support services, while increasing greater opportunity for local labor force absorption. 
Downtown locations are preferable, provided there is a major research and financing 
component located nearby. On-line services also will facilitate the government-to-business 
relations (i.e., quick permitting processes or on-line permitting). 
 
•  Downtown locations have a good share of old Class C space that can satisfy ‘telecom’-related 
demand. ‘High-tech’ uses, though, will require up-to-date technology and around-the-clock 
security and cooling systems. An “information district” works very much like a technology 
park. A collection or concentration of Internet-ready buildings and their users, whose 
concerns include research and development (R&D), will also desire to have access to a good 
transportation network, and quality housing and leisure services (e.g., a theater district and 
waterfront). “Information district” buildings should, therefore, be selected by carefully 
identifying three to four ‘anchor’ properties that will help to define the area and allow the 
remaining properties to develop over time. 
 
•  Finally, the political commitment and “organizing capacity” of the real estate brokers and 
venture capitalists to the local community leaders and the Mayor, together with the on-going 
management of and a dynamic marketing strategy for the “information district” will improve 
chances of success. 
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